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pREFacE: GovERnMEnt and thE Good liFE
Simon Griffiths
in 961, reflecting on a long and seemingly successful life, Abdul 
Rahman iii, Caliph of Cordoba, wrote:
I have now reigned above fifty years in victory or peace; beloved 
by my subjects, dreaded by my enemies, and respected by my 
allies. Riches and honours, power and pleasure, have waited 
on my call, nor does any earthly blessing appear to have been 
wanting to my felicity. In this situation, I have diligently numbered 
the days of pure and genuine happiness which have fallen to my 
lot: they amount to fourteen.1
Two weeks of happiness in a lifetime of abundance is pretty scant. 
More than 1,000 years later the Caliph’s gloomy reflections are 
more relevant than ever before, and are mirrored in two related 
questions that run through the chapters in this book. 
First, why are we no happier now than we once were (or to 
use the language of the social scientists, why is ‘subjective well-
being’ no higher)? even in recession, most of us in the west are far 
wealthier than at any time in previous decades. between 1957 and 
2006, the UK’s gDP per person almost trebled in real terms, rising 
from £6,960 to £19,978.2  Roughly speaking, orthodox economics 
equates a rise in the level of purchasing power with an increase 
in the wellbeing of a society.3 Yet, during the same period, the 
proportion of people in the UK who said that they were “very 
happy” fell from 52% to 36%.4 other surveys present a slightly less 
pessimistic picture of wellbeing trends, but in almost all cases they 
1 edward gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (electric book Company, 2001), Volume V, 401. 
2  office of national Statistics, “Time Series Data”, www.statistics.gov.uk 
3  Richard layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (london: Penguin, 2005)
4  Mark easton, “britain’s happiness in decline”, bbC online, Tuesday, 2 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
programmes/happiness_formula/4771908.stm 
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show that we are no happier now than we were a generation or so 
ago.5 This has become known as the “paradox of progress”.6  
Some commentators have even argued that there is a direct 
link between the pursuit of wealth and unhappiness. The quest 
for ever-greater gDP by governments or for ever-greater affluence 
by individuals has been compared to a sickness – often dubbed 
“affluenza”.7 And there are those who would argue that the 
affluenza of bankers, taking ever higher risks, is at least in part 
responsible for our current woes. These arguments are specific 
examples of an older and wider critique of consumerism that 
runs through RH Tawney’s The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society and 
Thorstein Veblen’s critique of “conspicuous consumption”.8 
Second, the authors in this book ask, should increasing levels 
of subjective wellbeing be the main aim of government?  A survey 
for the bbC found that a massive 81% of people thought that 
government’s prime objective should be happiness not wealth.9 
This has long been the argument of utilitarians, from their “founding 
father”, Jeremy bentham, at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
to Richard layard - the author who has done most to popularise 
the doctrine’s contemporary revival. These authors argue that 
happiness is the only thing that is “self-evidently good”. As layard 
writes: “if we are asked why happiness matters, we can give no 
further, external reason. it just obviously does matter”.10 All other 
5  The evidence is compiled in the online annex to layard’s Happiness, available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
layard/annex.pdf
6  Richard A. easterlin, “Does economic growth improve the Human lot?” in Paul A. David and Melvin w. 
Reder, eds., Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, (new York: 
Academic Press, inc., 1974) 
7  See John De graaf, David wann and Thomas H. naylor, Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic (San Fransisco: 
berrett-Koehler, 2001); Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss, Affluenza: When Too Much is Never Enough (Crows 
nest, nSw: Allen & Unwin, 2005) and, most recently, oliver James, Affluenza (london: Vermilion, 2007).
8  RH Tawney, The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society, (london: Fabian Society, 1920); Thorstein Veblen, The 
Theory of the Leisure Class (originally 1899), http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/833 
9 easton, “britain’s happiness in decline” 
10 layard, Happiness, 113
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goods - freedom, equality or health, for example – are important if, 
and only if, they are “instrumental” to happiness.  This idea is rarely 
taken as seriously as it is in the small Himalayan kingdom of bhutan, 
which since 1972 has assessed policies according to gnH (gross 
national Happiness) rather than gDP (gross Domestic Product).11
The view that happiness is the “greatest good” – and hence, 
that the happiness of the people should be the main aim 
government - has long been challenged. To the philosopher 
isaiah berlin, utilitarianism was part of the “ionian” fallacy – the 
tendency to privilege one value above all others.12  nowhere 
is this fallacy better satirised that in Aldous Huxley’s dystopian 
novel, Brave New World:
“But I don’t want comfort” [said John the Savage] “I want 
God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want 
goodness, I want sin.”
“In fact”, said Mustapha Mond [World Controller for Western 
Europe] “you’re claiming the right to be unhappy” . . .
“Not to mention . . . the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains 
of every kind.”
There was a long silence.
“I claim them all,” said the savage at last.13
it may be that the world is “incorrigibly plural”14 and that the 
focus on happiness does not reflect the many possible good 
things in life that are valuable: freedom, social justice, community 
and so on.15 
11  Andrew C. Revkin, ‘A new Measure of well-being From a Happy little Kingdom’, The New York Times, 
october 4, 2005, http://www.gpiatlantic.org/conference/media/nyt1004.pdf
12  See, for example, isaiah berlin, “Does Political Theory Still exist”, in The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry 
Hardy and Roger Hausheer (london: Pimlico, 1998), 78.
13 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (london: Chatto and windus, 1932), 237
14 louis Macneice, Snow, http://www.artofeurope.com/macneice/mac5.htm 
15   An argument put forward in the twentieth century by isaiah berlin – see his “Does Political Theory Still 
exist” – and more recently by John gray – see his Berlin (london: Fontana Press, 1995).
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There are other questions and concerns with government’s role 
in promoting happiness – many of them staples of undergraduate 
political philosophy courses: Can the happiness of the few be 
sacrificed for the much greater happiness of many? what obligation 
is owed to future generations or to the planet? is raising average 
levels of happiness more important than ending specific cases of 
unhappiness? Can one category – happiness – cover all our feelings 
of pleasure, bliss, joy, awe or contentment? is the same true for 
all the shades of unhappiness? layard deals with many of these 
classical challenges to utilitarianism in his contribution to this book. 
The authors of this book – who include agenda-setting 
thinkers from politics, journalism and academia – go in search of 
the modern theoretical source of the debate by examining the 
contribution of earlier modern “greats”: J.S. Mill, Keynes, Crosland, 
galbraith and Scitovsky. in an Afterword, layard brings this book up 
to date with a contemporary argument for a utilitarian approach to 
public policy. with one exception, all of the writers in this book and 
their subjects worked largely in britain or the US, which goes some 
way to supporting nietzsche’s jibe about the grounded empiricism 
of Anglophone philosophy: “Mankind does not strive for happiness; 
only the englishman does that.”16
The result of the contributors’ search is the rediscovery of a 
debate that has largely bubbled beneath the surface. At times, 
however, the call for happiness to be at the centre of government 
action has been public and explicit. Such was the contribution of 
Mill and the earlier utilitarians in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. it is Mill, therefore, who is the first thinker discussed in 
this book, and his attempt to balance – some would say combine 
– freedom with happiness in a vision of “the good life” sets the 
theoretical tone for the rest of the book. 
16  Friedrich nietzsche (trans. R.J. Hollingdale), Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (london and new York: 
Penguin books, 1990)
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The later writers discussed here span the twentieth century: 
“the age of extremes” that saw increasing wealth, punctuated by 
bloody war.17 Under these conditions, perhaps it is understandable 
that many of these writers are better known for their contributions 
to more immediately pressing debates: Keynes on the economic 
consequence of the peace or Crosland on the limits of the state in 
the modern economy, for example. Yet, the authors discussed in 
this collection also have much to offer in searching for answers to 
those questions that began this preface. 
For layard, happiness is an idea whose “time has come”.18  The 
government’s recent decision to launch what the media described 
as “happiness lessons” in schools (more formally, classes in the Social 
and emotional Aspects of learning, or SeAl) seems to support 
layard’s claim. The Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, has 
also got in on the act, claiming that “it’s time we focused not just 
on gDP, but on gwb - general well-being”.19 
Today, questions about well-being have been subsumed 
by economic questions. but the debate is perennial. There is no 
consensus on the questions raised in this preface, even between 
the contributors. Yet, as we begin a slow move out of recession, 
Crosland’s statement remains relevant: “we do not want to enter 
the age of abundance, only to find that we have lost the values 
which might teach us how to enjoy it.”20
17 eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991  (london: Vintage, 1996) 
18 layard, ‘Afterword’ in this volume. 
19  bbC online, “Make People Happier, Says Cameron”, 22 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_
politics/5003314.stm  
20 Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (greenwood Press, 1963), p. 361
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intRoduction: thE nEW utilitaRianiSM
Richard Reeves
“Ask yourself if you are happy”, wrote John Stuart Mill, “and you 
cease to be so.”21 in which case, we are in bad shape. For asking we 
are. The shelves of “self-help” sections of bookshops groan under 
the weight of advice on how to discover inner Peace or Perfect 
Happiness. Famously enshrined in the US Constitution, the search 
for happiness has now become a general pursuit.
At the same time, happiness has become an area of empirical 
academic enquiry. Previously the sustained subject of only 
the individualist approaches of psychology or the sweeping 
conceptualisations of classical philosophy, happiness – or 
“subjective well-being” – now has a flourishing dedicated branch 
within the social sciences, and in particular economics. Since time 
began, we have had poems, symphonies and philosophies devoted 
to the subject of happiness. now we have regression lines too.
large, robust data-sets can now be used to test the influence 
of a wide range of factors on happiness.22 Most of the results give 
some reassuring statistical significance to common sense: lasting 
marriages, good health, exercise, education, good relationships 
with children, religious faith, friends, sex and a certain level of 
wealth are good for happiness; unemployment, death of an 
intimate, poverty, chronic ill-health and divorce are bad. And at 
a national level, the data suggests that above a certain point of 
economic development (around a gross Domestic Product of 
$20,000 per person),23 the wealth of a society has no influence on 
average levels of happiness within it, as Richard layard argues in 
21  John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (london: Penguin, 1989), 118.
22  in this introduction “happiness” is used – not without misgivings – to mean “subjective well-being”.
23  Richard layard, Happiness (london: Penguin, 2005), 33
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this volume.24 nonetheless, the data flowing out of these new fields 
is of potentially profound importance. For the first time it is possible 
not only to identify but also to rank and weigh the influence of 
various factors on happiness. if happiness is accepted as a goal for 
political endeavour (and of course this is a very a big “if”, as we shall 
see) then the research is of vital policy significance.
but so far, with a few notable exceptions, the burgeoning 
empirical work on happiness is not being accompanied by equally 
rigorous work on the philosophical and political side. The field, as 
it stands, is over-researched and under-theorised. The result of this 
asymmetry is that the data is principally of academic, rather than 
political, import. but help is at hand. 
Many of the challenges posed by the data have been anticipated 
and addressed by a clutch of thinkers whose principal fault, in this 
area at least, may have been to be too far ahead of their time. This 
volume revisits the work of these writers in the light of the new 
research. At the very least, our hope is to ensure that contemporary 
debates take into account the work of previous generations, rather 
than – as happens all too often in political discourse – starting from 
scratch. in different ways, the five authors featured in this volume 
– Mill, Keynes, Crosland, galbraith and Scitovsky – prefigured the 
contemporary empirical research on happiness.
These authors differ in many important respects in both their 
diagnoses and their prescriptions, yet they all address the central 
question of how best to promote human flourishing in affluent 
societies. And this was all in a time before there was much, if any, 
data to support their intuition. This means that the intellectual 
history of the political economy of well-being is topsy-turvy: the 
24   good summaries of the research can be found in bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Robert lane, The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies 
(new Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), Richard layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (london: 
Allen lane, 2005).
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implications were drawn out before the data was gathered in. 
Consequently, the impact of the political insights of these writers, 
in this arena at least, was blunted. 
while some of the issues teased out are highly specific, there 
are a number of recurring themes cutting across the collection, 
which together animate the principal arenas of the politics of well-
being: consumption, the formation of preferences, work, family life, 
security, and the implications and role – if any – of politics.
conSuMption
The issue at the heart of this collection is consumption: what and how 
much we buy, why we buy it, how rationally we buy and what impact 
our purchases have on our well-being and the well-being of others. 
The definition of consumption here is narrow: only those goods and 
services that are paid for. it is possible to think about consumption 
more broadly, in terms of activities, time or energy. Scitovsky in 
particular tends to use “consumption” in this way, so that it can 
include activities such as reading or leisure time with friends. but for 
the purposes of this discussion, the narrower definition is most useful
The writers assessed in this volume view consumption 
through a mostly negative lens. Much material consumption is 
seen as a wasteful pursuit of objects whose value lies principally 
in the signalling of status – an idea at least as old as the work 
of the sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen, in the late 
nineteenth century.25 This scepticism about consumption is shared 
by several of the authors discussed in this book, including Mill, 
Keynes and galbraith. Scitovsky, for example, argued that markets 
were structurally biased towards “defensive” (i.e. material) forms 
of consumption, aimed at making life comfortable, and against 
25  Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (new York: Dover, 1994).
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“creative consumption”:26 those “self-rewarding and creative 
activities that provide most of life’s pleasure”.27
Crosland, by contrast, had a more sanguine view, warning 
against the tendency of the left to undervalue working-class 
prosperity, which he saw as a key plank of his egalitarian political 
philosophy. As he wrote in 1974: 
My working-class constituents … want washing machines and 
refrigerators to relieve domestic drudgery; they want cars, and 
the freedom they give on weekends and holidays; and they 
want package tour holidays to Majorca … why should they too 
not enjoy the sun?28
when we turn to the critics of consumption, it is important to be alert 
for potential bias – especially when they tend to be relatively wealthy 
themselves. bianchi describes Scitovsky’s childhood home in budapest 
as “a mansion of 18,000 square feet, beautifully furnished and decorated 
with the luxury of eighteenth-century France”.29 Mill was more than 
comfortable financially, and Keynes and galbraith were hardly paupers.
There are two dangers here. The first is that the writer will 
assume that the “economic problem” has been solved for the general 
population because it has been solved for them. it is difficult to 
countenance, now, Mill’s view that there was sufficient affluence in 
mid-nineteenth-century england for further growth to be necessary. 
At least Keynes projected the solving of the economic problem a 
century ahead of the 1930s. There is a related difficulty in anticipating 
how today’s “luxuries” become tomorrow’s “necessities” precisely by 
virtue of dissemination. it may have seemed to galbraith in 1958 that 
26  Tibor Scitovsky, “notes on the Producer Society”, The Economist 121, no. 3 (1973), 225–50.
27  See bianchi in this volume, 81
28   Anthony Crosland, “A Social Democratic britain”, in Anthony Crosland, Socialism Now, ed. Dick leonard 
(london: Cape, 1974).
29  See bianchi in this volume, 78-79
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wants for further goods must be synthetic, given the great affluence 
he saw around him. but the benchmarks against which need is 
assessed rise. Air-conditioning in cars, seen as a necessity by just one 
in ten Americans 35 years ago, is now judged a necessity by two-
thirds of the population.30 And this is not merely a status-signalling 
device; the fact is that being in a hot car or house is disagreeable by 
comparison to air-conditioned comfort. if US economic development 
had stalled in 1958, and air-conditioning had remained out of reach 
of most consumers, it is hard to argue that their lives would be better, 
regardless of measurements of subjective well-being.
Second, there is a danger that wealthy theorists might attach 
a higher value to their own forms of consumption than to those 
of others. Three of the authors examined in this volume – Mill, 
Keynes and Scitovsky – make an explicit distinction between 
types of desire or consumption: what Mill calls “higher” and “lower” 
pleasures. while there may be sound scientific bases for making 
such distinctions, there is also a danger of subjectively attaching 
greater value to the “finer” goods and services typically enjoyed by 
the affluent: opera is simply assumed to be superior to oprah. 
The difficulty with any analysis of consumption from the 
perspective of well-being is thus the danger of subjective 
judgements. This is where the new empirical work is so important. 
with robust measures of subjective well-being, it is now possible 
to measure the impact of various consumption decisions. So far, 
most of the research in this area has been based on highly stylised 
laboratory experiments, but the foundation stones for more 
research in the field have been laid. As Daniel Kahneman, one of 
the leading researchers in the field says, “a systematic empirical 
study of the issues that Scitovsky raised is now both possible 
and necessary”.31
30 Alain de botton, Status Anxiety (london: Penguin, 2004), 205.
31   Daniel Kahneman, in Choices, Values and Frames, ed. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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pREFEREncES
A second thread running through the chapters that follow is the 
formation of individual preferences. why do we want what we want? 
Are preferences formed autonomously? Are our wants rational? Do 
we want the things that will make us happy? if not, why not?
Mill was clear that ordinary people were terrible judges of their 
own best interests. while most people could judge their “basic” 
consumption requirements, there were other forms of consumption 
“the want of which is least felt where the need is greatest. This is 
peculiarly true of those things which are chiefly useful as tending 
to raise the character of human beings. The uncultivated cannot be 
competent judges of cultivation.”32
indeed, galbraith argues that, in the private sector, the 
relationship between demand and supply in affluent nations has 
been effectively reversed: “wants are dependent on production. 
The producer [has] the function both of making the goods and of 
making the desires for them.”33 with the “hidden persuaders” of the 
advertising industry creating the desire for the products of their 
clients, the idea that desires spring up in autonomous individuals 
is, to galbraith, a fantasy. 
There is certainly growing evidence for the irrationality of 
consumer behaviour. The work of Kahneman and Tverksy, in 
particular, shows that individuals differ from the “rational economic 
man” of textbook theory in various significant ways: they weigh losses 
more heavily than gains, hugely prefer the status quo over change, 
overpredict the utility gains (measured in subjective well-being) from 
acquisitions, misremember the impact of past events and are highly 
32  John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 947.
33  J.K. galbraith, The Affluent Society (london: Hamish Hamilton), 128.
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sensitive to the way in which a choice is “framed” to them.34 in other 
words, there is mounting evidence that, at least from a happiness 
perspective, people don’t do what’s good for them. Scitovsky argued 
30 years ago that people make sub-optimal choices because they 
over-value the short term, misremember utility and then fall into a 
habit of repeating these choices. And, as bianchi reminds us, habits 
are hard to break – they have their own value.35 
but even if the shreds of evidence that the preferences of 
individuals are non-optimal in terms of their well-being accumulate 
into a compelling body of research, the case for any kind of political 
intervention to improve people’s well-being will be far from made. 
Mill was famously clear that the state had no business coercing 
people into doing what was best for them.36 but, as Kahneman 
suggests, the empirical support for these intuitions poses some 
sharp questions about the best way to increase well-being, and 
indeed the possible role for paternalist policies. “if people do not 
know what is going to make them better off or give them pleasure,” 
he says, “then the idea that you can trust people to do what will give 
them pleasure becomes questionable.”37 it may be that maximising 
happiness is the wrong benchmark of success. individuals may make 
decisions on grounds other than their own subjective well-being. 
And, most important of all, knowing that someone is irrationally 
acting in ways which are against their own best interests is not, in 
itself, sufficient warrant to stop them: at least not in a free society.
nonetheless, the possibility that our economy and society 
may be structured in ways which militate against well-being 
should give us pause. efforts to make consumers more “skilful”, 
34  Kahneman, Choices, Values and Frames.
35  See bianchi in this volume, 84-87
36   John Stuart Mill, “on liberty”, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on 
Representative Government, ed. geraint williams (everyman, 1993), 78.
37   Quoted in Jon gertner, “The Futile Pursuit of Happiness”. New York Times, 7 September 2003, http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9e0DeFD61538F934A3575AC0A9659C8b63&sec=technology&spon=
&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
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as Scitovsky suggests,38 might be important. And even if policy 
prescriptions do not flow easily, there are a number of areas where 
improvements might be possible. Perhaps the best candidate is in 
the way we work.
WoRk
As the economy worsens, work and worklessness are in the news 
again. A huge part of labour’s success story has been a benign 
jobs market, in contrast, they claimed, to the high levels of 
unemployment that existed under the Conservatives in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The return to the horrors of unemployment highlights 
the central social, economic and psychological importance of 
work in our lives. The influence of paid employment occupies an 
important place in the thinking of many of the writers assessed 
in the following chapters, and the theme is extended by the 
contributors, especially Halligan. The earlier writers, Mill and Keynes, 
assumed that rising affluence alongside a lessening desire for more 
material goods would result in dramatic reductions in working 
hours. in Mill’s “stationary state … a much larger body of persons 
than at present [would be] not only exempt from the coarser toils 
but with sufficient leisure … to cultivate freely the graces of life.”39 
Keynes was more specific, holding out the possibility of a 15-hour 
working week and “abundant leisure”.40 Halligan shows how far 
we are from at least this Keynesian prediction, with four out of ten 
UK full-time employees putting in more than 40 hours a week. He 
laments our “work-obsessed culture”, tendency to work “pointlessly 
long hours”41 and the rise of facilitating technologies such as sand-
proof laptops for use on the beach.
38   Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (new York: oxford University 
Press, 1992).
39  Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 755.
40   John Maynard Keynes, “economic Possibilities for our grandchildren”, in Essays in Persuasion (london: 
MacMillan, 1972).
41  See Halligan in this volume, 51
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it is unhelpful to see work as simply an enemy of well-being. 
work provides many of the opportunities for creativity, learning 
and purpose in life. it is a long way – in well-being terms – from 
being a “disutility”. Mill and Keynes, writing when the majority of 
the workforce was employed in agriculture or industry, can be 
forgiven for wishing to promote the “leisure” to learn, converse, 
read and develop new skills. but in the twenty-first century, the 
labour market can be supplier of these opportunities, too.
So the right question now is not how we minimise work, but how 
we ensure that the quality of work can improved across the board. 
As the US political scientist Robert lane argues, the goal should be 
to move from a consumer economy towards a “producer economy” 
– one which places as much value on the satisfactions gained from 
earning as from spending.42 This is no small challenge. Right now, 
workplace improvements have to be justified against the standards 
of business effectiveness; and the truth is that better work for the 
worker does not always translate into higher profits for the firm. it will 
therefore take much more than a clutch of modest, though welcome, 
policies to engineer such a shift towards greater worker well-being. 
FaMily 
A good family life is, not surprisingly, strongly associated with life 
satisfaction. And the quality of care received by a child, especially 
in the early years, almost certainly has a strong influence on his 
or her lifetime “endowment” of happiness.43 So from a well-being 
perspective, encouraging and supporting family life has both 
short-term and long-term benefits.
However, the role of family life is not a dominant theme in the 
work of any of the featured authors. This may be explained by their 
42  Robert lane, The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
43   See, for example, eirini Flouri, “Psychological outcomes in midadulthood associated with mother’s child-
rearing attitudes in early childhood”, European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 13, 1 (2004), 35–41. 
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gender, by the fact that many of them did not have children of their 
own, and perhaps by the fact that most of them wrote at a time 
when the division of labour between men and women was largely 
unquestioned. The relationship between labour market participation 
and the sustaining of family life – and in particular raising children – 
was not considered in any detail. Today, of course, the issues of “work–
life balance”, childcare and the gendered division of unpaid labour are 
high up the agenda.
given that both paid work and family contribute positively 
to well-being, the real challenge is to help families choose and 
manage their lives in ways which maximise both choice and well-
being for parents, and encourage secure and loving environments 
for children, especially the very young. All these are likely to be 
positive from a well-being perspective, especially those initiatives 
promoting flexible working patterns.
Currently, the labour market is still largely constructed around 
the model of a breadwinning male. From a purely business 
perspective, full-time employees who are able to focus on their 
job, safe in the knowledge that their spouse is keeping the home 
fires burning – what Americans call a “career primary” – is ideal. in 
order for women to compete as anything close to equals in this 
labour market, they have to become “quasi-men”, aping the hours 
and attitudes of someone without caring responsibilities. This in 
turn means that very young children have to spend very long 
days in childcare – with some potentially significant downsides 
in terms of their future development. This is not progress. Some 
of the government’s pronouncements in this area – such as the 
lauding of “dawn-to-dusk” schooling – suggest that, rather than 
creating a family-friendly economy, the goal is the creation of 
economy-friendly families.44 Rather than accepting the labour 
44   i expand on the arguments in this paragraph in a chapter in Family Fortunes: The New Politics of Childhood, 
ed. Patrick Diamond, Sunder Katwala and Meg Munn (london: Fabian Society, 2004).
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market as it is, and adjusting family life to suit, we should be 
doing the opposite.
Halligan shows that the causes of “long” working hours and the 
choices made by parents both to remain in full-time employment 
are complex and varied. while it is certainly the case that many 
families need two incomes to sustain a decent standard of living, 
it is worth remembering that households containing two parents 
in full-time employment are drawn disproportionately from 
the upper end of the occupational scale. it is hard to argue that 
two merchant bankers only work full time because of economic 
necessity, unless the concept of “need” is stretched beyond any 
useful definition. Halligan also points to “obsession with relative 
consumption”.45 This might explain the decision of some to work 
more than they would otherwise choose. Finally, as discussed in the 
previous section, people may work long hours because they like 
their jobs and derive great satisfaction from them.
what this means is that the choices and trade-offs between 
employment and family time made by parents are based less on 
simple economic calculations than on their own desires, morals 
and priorities. in other words, we are again in the realm of values. 
SEcuRity
insecurity is bad for happiness. At a national level, sharp social and 
economic change tends to be associated with a drop in subjective 
well-being. And for individuals, divorce and unemployment 
weigh against happiness.46 indeed, as galbraith anticipated, it 
may also be that geographical mobility is negatively associated 
with well-being, not least because of the loss of community ties 
and networks:
45  See Halligan in this volume, 48 
46   bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human 
Well-being (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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If a locality is declining … then one should encourage the 
people to leave. Mobility means efficiency. It is true that the ties 
of family, friends, pastor and priest, countryside and mere inertia 
may make this a Draconian and even cruel prescription. But it is 
the efficient course.47
However, whilst some consistancy and security in life is beneficial 
for well-being, too much is inimical to it. A flourishing life requires 
novelty, stimulation, challenge and surely at least some risk and 
uncertainty. Keynes was worried about the impact of too much 
leisure. Scitovsky was particularly concerned with the “problem 
of boredom”.48 He became very worried about the boredom 
faced by those without sufficient resources or opportunities for 
“creative consumption” – a group he somewhat quaintly (and 
non-pejoratively) dubbed the “idle poor”. in the absence of skills 
for relieving boredom in a harmless way it is “easy to revert to the 
excitement of violence and vandalism”.49 And then we need ASbos.
in Mill’s terms, well-being requires a balance of “tranquillity” – or 
peace of mind – and “excitement”. For modern politicians and policy-
makers interested in well-being, the goal is to provide both security 
and opportunity: the security that comes from a reduction in the fear 
of crime, or of losing your job, or of being poor in old age, or uncared 
for if sick alongside the opportunities for mobility, stimulation, novelty, 
pleasure – and choice. A difficulty is that while markets are effective at 
producing opportunity, they can undermine security. And if the benefits 
from the former come to be outweighed by the costs of the latter, 
market-led growth may not be optimal from a well-being perspective; 
affluent economies may be over-producing “excitement” and under- 
producing “tranquillity”.
47  galbraith, The Affluent Society, 212.
48  See bianchi in this volume, 87-89
49  See bianchi in this volume, 89
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politicS
one of the aims of this volume is to tease out from the works of 
the featured thinkers implications for contemporary politics. now 
that many of their insights and intuitions into the challenges of 
affluence have some empirical validation, can any elements of their 
analysis or prescription be turned to political use?
This is a question being asked in a few corners of whitehall. The 
government’s Strategy Unit paper on life satisfaction frames the 
question thus: 
If we accept that life satisfaction is an important objective 
and can be influenced, then the literature throws down 
a fundamental challenge to policymakers. If decades of 
legislation, economic growth and increased life expectancy 
have barely affected the life satisfaction of the British people, 
then what should government be doing?50
There are two pretty big “ifs” in this passage, relating to both the 
legitimacy of subjective well-being as a political aspiration, and to 
the likelihood of any official action affecting it in any case. Hickson, 
following Crosland, disputes the value of happiness as a goal for 
the centre-left, arguing in particular that measures of well-being 
cannot replace ideology as the ultimate guide to policy.51 
First, as Hickson argues in this volume, it is by definition difficult 
to measure our own preferences. we make decisions in the dark, 
without the full facts being available, and have no certainty as to 
the full consequences of any action. in short, we do not have the 
information needed to judge what makes us happy. Second, Hickson 
notes, even if it were possible to objectively measure the utility of our 
50 Donovan and Halpern, Life Satisfaction, 33.
51 See Hickson in this volume, 64-66
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own preferences, it is not possible to determine with any degree of 
accuracy how they compare to the preferences of others. He gives the 
example of a situation where the rich person can derive more utility 
from the retention of the final 1% of their income in order to purchase 
a yacht than the poorer person would gain in being able to use that 
additional 1% on the weekly grocery shop. The subjectivity of utility 
– especially in relation to how it is affected by wealth and income 
– makes it impossible to use happiness as a justification for greater 
redistribution. For the left to use utilitarianism to justify redistribution 
is a weak argument. Utility is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, 
and the relationship between wealth, income and utility is deeply 
subjective. Happiness, Hickson concludes, should not therefore be 
the guiding principle that underpins the idea of social justice. 
These are serious challenges. but two rejoinders are worth 
considering. The first is that the headline numbers for the UK reveal 
some statistically significant differences in levels of life satisfaction 
between different groups in society, with divisions by gender, 
age, employment, income bracket, educational attainment and 
marital status.52 even if life satisfaction is not the ultimate centre-
left success measure, these inequalities should certainly trouble a 
social democrat. Second, while the overall UK figures for happiness 
are stable over time, there are some sizable differences between 
nations. of course, cultural variables are likely to be important here 
– but it may also be the case that economic, social and political 
structures have an influence too. why is well-being falling in the US, 
especially among women? why are the Dutch and Danes happier 
than the germans and French? why are people in Swiss cantons 
with more regular referendums happier?53
A running theme in many of the following chapters is the 
decline of collective action, in contrast to the predictions of Mill, 
52  David blanchflower and Andrew oswald, “well-being over Time in britain and the USA”, Journal of Public 
Economics 88, no. 7–8 (2004), 1359–86.
53 Frey and Stutzer, Happiness and Economics.
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Keynes and Crosland that economic progress would diminish 
individualism and enhance collectivism. Hutton, agreeing 
with galbraith, wonders if this is inevitable, whether affluence 
necessarily corrodes collectivism and collectively based politics. 
As he writes: 
[A]ffluence both removes the urgency of such a political 
response and undermines the progressive coalition. The swelling 
ranks of the affluent middle class do not feel the same urge to 
express collective solidarity and use public goods; they can pay 
for private goods and their quest for satisfaction not through 
collective action but in individual acts of spending that will 
satiate a newly articulated need.54
it is certainly true that greater affluence takes some of the fire of 
social justice out of social democracy. This is not to say that fighting 
poverty is not a vital task; but it is to say that the nature of the 
poverty being fought is less glaring in its injustice. labour may need, 
as Crosland argued, to be as committed as ever to an egalitarian 
ideology: but affluence makes the contours of that ideology ever 
harder to draw. but there is a more positive view of the relationship 
between affluence and social democracy. if individuals are over-
investing time and energy in the pursuit of material goods because 
everyone else is doing the same, thereby continually raising the bar, 
then what we arguably face is a giant collective action problem. 
individual, apparently rational choices – the “tyranny of small 
decisions” – add up to a society far more acquisitive than the one 
we might choose. And if this is the case, then the need for collective 
action to change the direction and recalibrate the success measures 
of society has perhaps never been greater. 
The real challenge, however, is less in policy-formulation than 
in value-formation. The authors dissected in this volume were 
54 See Hutton in this volume, 75
well-being
25
unanimous in the view that the shift required for affluent societies 
to derive maximum benefit from their wealth was one of attitude, 
culture and values. 
Perhaps what is needed is to alter the way we look at the world, 
to re-order our priorities – in short, to engage in a collective process 
of revaluation. Perhaps this could be part of what labour politicians 
are calling the “progressive consensus”. it would certainly help if the 
government were to work harder at establishing better benchmarks 
of progress than the ones Mill said “excite the congratulations 
of ordinary politicians; the mere increase of production and 
accumulation”.55 Robert Kennedy, as so often, said it best:
[GDP] does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of 
their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty 
of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of 
our public debates or the integrity of our public officials. It measures 
neither courage, nor our wisdom, not our devotion to our country. 
It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life 
worthwhile, and it can tell us everything about America, except 
why we are proud to be Americans.56
The nascent politics of happiness still lacks anything like enough 
data, is philosophically underdeveloped and chimes with few of 
the concerns of contemporary politicians. but an important start 
is being made in a number of quarters. it is critical, as this work 
is undertaken, to remember that people were thinking creatively 
about how best to promote human flourishing in affluent societies 
before any of the equations were written. Perhaps the greatest hope 
of this volume is to show those engaged in the task of constructing 
a new politics of well-being that some of the necessary tools were 
fashioned many years ago.
55 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 755.
56  Robert F. Kennedy, Speech given at the University of Kansas, 18 March 1968, http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/RFK/RFKSpeech68Mar18UKansas.htm.
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1. Mill: thE aRt oF liFE 
Richard Reeves
in 1848, europe was in the throes of revolution. but John Stuart 
Mill, while passionately concerned with the outcome of the 
democratic uprisings, had his mind on the more distant future. 
Already established as one of england’s leading men of letters, 
Mill published his Principles of Political Economy, which was to 
become one of the definitive works of nineteenth-century political 
economy.57 in it, he sketched his vision of a society in which the 
pursuit of wealth had been replaced by the cultivation of the 
“graces of life”, men and women lived as equals and freedom had 
become the ultimate measure of civilisation.
The Principles, published when Mill was in his early 40s, was in part 
the product of a difficult, but exceptional, childhood. Mill’s upbringing 
was an experiment in rational utilitarianism conducted by his father, 
James Mill, and godfather, Jeremy bentham. Thanks to the intense, 
bullying attentions of his father he became an infant prodigy. He 
was steeped in classical language, history and culture, and was an 
accomplished logician and political economist by his mid-teens. He 
also had no friends, no toys and little love, and at 20 he suffered a “crisis 
in [his] mental history”,58 from which he eventually recovered with the 
help of wordsworth’s poetry. but the result of his breakdown was the 
beginning of a long, slow desertion from utilitarian ranks. Though he 
later wrote a famous essay, “Utilitarianism”, he is best remembered not 
as a proselytiser on behalf of the utilitarian principle of “the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number”, but as the most eloquent advocate 
of human freedom ever to write in the english language. 
Mill’s philosophical vision derives both its power and its 
weakness from his various attempts to knit together a number of 
57 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965)
58 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (london: Penguin, 1989), 111.
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diverse threads. He never saw happiness as more important than 
freedom – an important consideration today when a new science 
of happiness is being fashioned in university economics and 
psychology departments. However, although he certainly wanted 
to preserve a space for individual action which should be free from 
interference, he also wanted to fill the idea of freedom with a rich 
conception of a good life. He was convinced that people should 
be masters and mistresses of their own lives, but also that some 
forms of life are better than others. The resulting zigzag trajectory 
of Mill’s work destroys any attempt to construct a coherent system 
from his voluminous writings (the reissued Collected Works runs to 
33 volumes).59 
Despite his bookish youth, Mill was a man who saw little value 
in ideas unless they were tethered to human improvement; his 
real greatness lay in his refusal to separate thought and action. 
Though his principal long-run impact has been intellectual, during 
his lifetime he was heavily engaged in politics and political action. 
Thus, not only did he write a timeless case for freedom of speech 
and action in On Liberty,60 but he went on to stand for Parliament 
and, as an elderly MP, he led the successful campaign against 
Disraeli’s attempt to ban demonstrations in public parks. 
However, his practicality meant he was often thinking and 
working on two different timescales simultaneously, and some of the 
apparent contradictions in his thought reflect this tension. on the one 
hand, he was concerned to bring about certain changes in the short 
term – wider suffrage, greater freedom of speech, the rationalisation 
of welfare and government, freer trade – and on the other, he was 
concerned about the longer-term consequences of the measures he 
was advocating: collective mediocrity, a tyranny of public opinion, an 
overweaning state and wasteful competitiveness.
59 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson (london: Routledge, 1996) 
60  “on liberty”, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. 
geraint williams (london: everyman, 1993), 69–185.
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Mill’s Principles of Political Economy is the main focus of this 
chapter. Having begun it in 1845, he was encouraged to complete 
it by the ineffectual response of the british government to the 
irish potato famine, which he described as “the most unqualified 
instance of signal failure which the practical genius of the english 
people has exhibited”.61 Principles was a bestseller, running to 32 
editions, but it is likely that its most original and lasting insights 
would have had little resonance with the irish poor. As a piece of 
economic analysis and prediction, the Principles is deeply flawed. 
Many of the assumptions Mill made about the nature of economic 
growth, the impact of a rising population and the role of technology 
were being chipped away even before he put pen to paper.62 And 
his treatment of socialism is at odds with many of his other views 
about the role of markets, both in the creation of goods and the 
promotion of freedom.63
but Mill’s identification of some of the challenges that would 
face affluent societies, his positive view of the possibilities of a zero-
growth society, his concern that the habits of consumption and 
capital accumulation would prove hard to break even when their 
value lessened, and his concern for cultivating the “Art of living” 
were all highly prescient. As so often with Mill, the true value of his 
thought would only become apparent decades, if not centuries, after 
publication. in at least three areas, the Principles was ahead of its time.
thE StationaRy StatE
Mill, following Ricardo, believed that economic growth was more 
likely to be the exception than the rule. with the financial surplus 
61 John Stuart Mill, “The Condition of ireland”, Morning Chronicle, 5 october 1846, 4
62  Michael St John Packe is scathing on this point: “His utter failure to take account of the advances [in 
economic thought] that had been made in the [previous] twenty years, had the effect of retarding the 
development of the science for a generation.” See Michael St John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill 
(london: Secker and warburg, 1954).
63  This is in no small part because the sections of socialism are more the work of Harriet Taylor, Mill’s long-
term companion and later wife, than of Mill himself.
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available for wages essentially fixed, the majority of workers would 
survive on a subsistence income, with population increases soaking 
up any additional capital. but while Ricardo viewed with gloom 
the constant likelihood of growth petering out into a stagnant, 
stationary state, Mill was positively upbeat about the possibilities 
of a zero-growth society. 
it was certainly the case that the striving for commercial success 
had some short-term value, but only as an alternative to atrophy: 
That the energies of mankind should be kept in employment 
by the struggle for riches, as they were formerly by the struggle 
for war, until the better minds succeed in educating the others 
into better things, is undoubtedly more desirable than that they 
should rust and stagnate … In the meantime, those who do 
not accept the present very early stage of human improvement 
as its ultimate type, may be excused for being comparatively 
indifferent to the kind of economical progress which excites the 
congratulations of ordinary politicians; the mere increase of 
production and accumulation.64
Mill would be disappointed by the way today’s “ordinary politicians” 
get excited by precisely the same sort of “economical progress”. in 
his view, further economic growth was already of dubious value in 
the mid-nineteenth century. The real issue was ensuring – through 
a scheme of almost total inheritance taxation – a fairer sharing out 
of the fruits of collective labour:
I know not why it should be a matter of congratulation that 
persons who are already richer than any one needs to be, 
should have doubled their means of consuming things which 
give little or no pleasure except as representative of wealth … 
It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased 
64 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 754–5. 
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production is still an important object: in the most advanced, 
what is economically needed is a better distribution.65
Ricardo and Mill were wrong in their economics (as Mill himself later 
realised).66 A stationary economic state is actually much more fragile 
than continuous growth. Far from dampening economic prospects, 
population growth and technological advance ensure an expanding 
pool of increasingly productive labour and a growing army of consumers. 
The fund available for wages is not fixed. nonetheless, Mill had carved 
out a unique philosophical and political position for himself. while 
Ricardo and his followers saw zero-growth as probable and unattractive, 
and the later orthodoxy took growth for granted, Mill saw the human 
and political possibilities of a cessation of commercial striving, with 
technological advances serving not to propel higher production for its 
own sake but releasing the population from the drudgery of unskilled 
work and providing leisure and energy for more worthwhile pursuits:
[A] stationary condition of capital and population implies no 
stationary state of human improvement. There would be as 
much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral 
and social progress; as much room for improving the Art of 
Living and much more likelihood of its being improved, when 
minds cease to be engrossed by the art of getting on.67
Mill’s utopian invocation of a stationary economic state prefigured 
the view of later economists – not least John Maynard Keynes – 
that economic growth had to be seen as a means to an end, rather 
than an end in itself.68 He also anticipated much of the thinking 
in the field of environmental economics; indeed, it is plausible 
to read the Principles as the first “green” economics treatise. Mill, 
who had a lifelong love of nature and botany, was concerned 
65 ibid., 755.
66 John Stuart Mill, “Thornton on labour and its Claims”, Fortnightly Review, May, 1869, 505-518.
67 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 756.
68 See liam Halligan’s chapter on Keynes in this volume.
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that the twin dynamics of population and production growth 
could create a world “from which solitude is extirpated’ and in 
which ‘every rood of land [is] brought under cultivation … every 
flowery waste or pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds 
which are not domesticated for man’s use exterminated as his rivals 
for food.”69
The stationary state, for Mill, was desirable not only on 
humanist grounds but on clear environmental ones too. writing at 
a time when the population of england was around 15 million70 and 
the population of the world just 1.2 billion,71 he issued a call that 
betters any press release from Friends of the Earth:
If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness 
which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth 
and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose 
of enabling it to support a larger, but not necessarily a better or 
a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, 
that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity 
compels them to it.72
Mill, then, has a strong claim to be one of the founders of the 
environmental movement. 
“StRuGGlinG to GEt on”
Mill had a distaste for the nature of industrialising life. in this he was 
far from alone. The opinion of much of educated england in the 
69 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 755.
70  Census office, “Population tables i, Vol. i. england and wales. Divisions i–Vii, 1851, Page xxxiii”, Online 
Historical Population Reports, http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/Pagebrowser?path=browse/
Census%20(by%20date)&active=yes&mno=27&tocstate=expandnew&display=sections&display=tables&
display=pagetitles&pageseq=35.
71  United nations, “The world at Six billion”, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/
sixbilpart1.pdf.
72 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 756.
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mid-nineteenth century was decidedly sniffy about the spectacle 
of rapid economic advance. To the bookish, music-loving, nature-
rambling Mill, the reality of economic progress was disagreeable:
I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by 
those who think that the normal state of human beings is that 
of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, 
and treading on each other’s heels, which form the existing 
type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or 
anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases 
of industrial progress.73
There is more than a touch of snobbery in Mill’s distaste at the 
sight of desperately poor families trying to earn as much money as 
one of his servants. but at least he saw the values of accumulation 
as being necessary for a key stage of industrial development. His 
hope was merely that the ‘symptom’ of selfishness, as he saw it, 
would be short-lived. Mill hoped and believed that people would 
naturally become more cooperative as the pressures of meeting 
physical needs abated. He heaped praise on Robert owen and on 
the Rochdale Pioneers, forerunners of the Cooperative wholesale 
Society. in his stationary utopia, the economy would be made up of 
similar associations, providing beveridgean cradle-to-grave welfare 
services to their members. in the long run, workers would refuse to 
work for any other kind of employer, so that even “private capitalists 
… will gradually find it necessary to make the entire body of 
labourers participants in profits”.74 As a result of this bloodless 
revolution: “[w]e may, through the cooperative principle, see our 
way to a change in society, which would combine the freedom and 
independence of the individual, with the moral, intellectual and 
economical advantages of aggregate production.”75
73 ibid., 754.
74 ibid., 793.
75 ibid.
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in this case Mill’s fears were better founded than his hopes. Far 
from moving in a cooperative direction, affluent countries have 
increasingly competitive economies and cultures. in his concerns 
about the social values associated with, and driving, economic 
growth, Mill anticipated many contemporary concerns about the 
imbalance between the values of selfishness and solidarity, greed 
and generosity, consumerism and cultivation. His fear was that the 
development of “mental culture” would be squeezed out by the rush 
to accumulate and acquire. A century and a half on, it is easy to say Mill 
was premature – but hard to say he was wrong.
iRRational conSuMERS 
one of the principal developments in the history of economics 
– closely associated with the work of Professor lionel Robbins in 
the 1930s – was the rejection of any attempt to make an external 
assessment of the “utility” that an individual gains or loses from a 
particular good or activity, or any utilitarian comparison between 
individuals. Rather, economists focus on what people actually do 
with the resources available to them, on the reasonable assumption 
that people will aim to maximise their own utility and are the best 
judges of how to go about doing so. The preferences of individuals, 
“revealed” through their market choices, can therefore be assumed to 
equate to their welfare.
The assumption that individuals rationally maximise their own 
utility has been under sustained attack in recent years. Richard Thaler 
has shown that economic behaviour consistently deviates from 
rational assumptions – for example, because people give losses a 
heavier weight than they do gains or because possession of a good 
increases its value in ways which the market fails to capture (an 
‘endowment effect’).76 And the nobel prize-winner Daniel Kahneman 
76  Richard Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation 1, no. 1 (1980), 44.
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has demonstrated that because of short-termism, misprediction, poor 
learning and myopia, individuals often make choices which are far from 
being in their own best interests.77 indeed, an entire academic field, 
behavioural economics, is now throwing down an empirical challenge 
to the rational utility-maximising model of human behaviour.
but Mill was here first. in particular, he anticipated much of the 
 research of the behavioural economists into the ability of consumers to 
 act in their own interests. while strongly in favour of laissez-faire as a 
political principle, he lists a number of exceptions to the non-
interventionist rule.78 He argues that the state can legitimately intervene 
to boost demand for goods that are beneficial to well-being but not 
avidly sought by most consumers. And so, while individuals were 
generally the best judge of “material objects”:
[There are] other things, of the worth of which the demand of 
the market is by no means a test; things of which the utility does 
not consist in ministering to inclinations, nor in serving the daily 
uses of life, and the want of which is least felt where the need is 
greatest. This is peculiarly true of those things which are chiefly 
useful as tending to raise the character of human beings. The 
uncultivated cannot be competent judges of cultivation.79
Again, it is tempting to dismiss Mill as a snob, and paternalist snob at 
that. The nineteenth-century language doesn’t help. but his point 
is one that has subsequently been made, in various forms, by many 
authors. Daniel Kahneman puts the challenge in the following way: 
“if people do not know what is going to make them better off, or 
give them pleasure, then the idea that you can trust people to do 
what will give them pleasure becomes questionable.”80
77  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).
78 Many of these, especially relating to social matters, are developed further in Mill, “on liberty”. 
79 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 947.
80 Quoted in Jon gertner, “The Futile Pursuit of Happiness”, New York Times, 7 September 2003, section 6, col. 1.
well-being
35
in other words, people do not maximise their own utility. 
in particular, individuals overvalue short-term and easy-to-
reach rewards. As Avner offer notes in his recent book The 
Challenge of Affluence: “Affluence breeds impatience, and 
impatience undermines wellbeing.”81 offer highlights the need 
for “commitment devices” and “commitment strategies” to help 
us choose the greater, but longer-term, good over the quick fix. 
but the two great things about instant gratification are that it is 
quick and that it feels good. investing in a relationship with a child, 
acquiring knowledge or developing a new skill – “things tending to 
raise the character” – are all long-term investments in well-being 
which can be squeezed out by immediate pleasures even though 
the final utility benefits of the quick fix are often less.
The market will indeed respond well to preferences – or ‘minister 
to inclinations’ – but will do nothing to educate or improve those 
preferences. As Mill puts it: “[T]he persons requiring improvement 
having an imperfect or altogether erroneous conception of what they 
want, the supply called forth by the demand of the market will be 
anything but what is really required.”82 Challenging the idea that 
individuals are equipped to decide, consume and act in their best 
interests and suggesting that the state should intervene to boost 
the supply of “cultivation” – perhaps the arts are a contemporary 
example? – were almost beside the point in a nation still struggling 
to lift the mass of its population out of poverty, and heretical in 
economic circles for most of the last century. but the new research 
on consumer behaviour, subjective well-being and preference 
formation supports much of Mill’s basic insight. The extent to 
which our political economy should take preferences at face value, 
or should be engaged in the shaping of those preferences, is very 
much alive in current debates: obesity is just one example.
81  Avner offer, The Challenge of Affluence – Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain since 1950 
(oxford: oxford University Press, 2006).
82 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 947; my emphasis.
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happinESS and FREEdoM
Above all, Mill was the first political economist to wrestle with 
the tensions between happiness and freedom. indeed, his whole 
intellectual life can be seen as an attempt to square the circle of 
his father’s pure, benthamite utilitarianism with his own instinctive 
liberalism. on the one hand, his 1861 essay “Utilitarianism” 
endorsed the “greatest Happiness Principle” as “the end of human 
action [and] standard of morality”.83 on the other, in “on liberty”, 
published in 1859, he asserted his famous “harm” principle: “The 
sole end for which mankind are warranted … in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection” and 
hence “any member of a civilised community … cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to 
do so, because it will make him happier.”84 Much of the messiness 
of Mill’s thought is explained by this unending struggle.
in the Principles, Mill was beginning to find the liberal voice for 
which he would become world-famous. i have already argued that 
he saw economic growth as a means to an end, rather than an end 
in itself – and that this end was variously described as “well-being”, 
“the graces of life”, “the Art of living”. He retained many of his 
father’s and bentham’s views about psychology, especially that the 
avoidance of pain and seeking of pleasure were the primary springs 
of human action. but it is clear that he believed that individual 
freedom of thought and action was the highest goal and, ultimately, 
a more important component of well-being than happiness (or 
what modern social scientists might call “subjective well-being”). 
“no society”, he wrote, “in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach 
can be in a wholesome state.”85 Far from promoting a society of 
unthinking bliss – a Prozac Nation – Mill wanted to “bring intellects 
83  “Utilitarianism”, in Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. williams, 
12.
84 Mill, “on liberty”, 78.
85 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 209.
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into stimulating collision”.86 Unlike bentham, he would have hated 
the soma-induced happiness of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.
He was finally agnostic about the implications of his views for 
the choice between socialism and capitalism, insisting only that both 
should be judged by the lights of their capacity to expand liberty:
If a conjecture may be hazarded, the decision will probably depend 
mainly on one consideration, viz., which of the two systems 
is consistent with the greatest amount of human liberty and 
spontaneity. After the means of subsistence are assured, the next 
in strength of the personal wants of human beings is liberty; and 
(unlike the physical wants, which as civilization advances become 
more moderate and more amenable to control) it increases instead 
of diminishing in intensity as the intelligence and the moral faculties 
are more developed.87 
However, it is fair to say that, at least in the way it developed in the 
following century, socialism definitely lost out on this score.
Mill wanted us to turn affluence to a better use than the 
production of further affluence: to the creation of a society that 
values learning, dissent, argument, companionship, creativity, 
equality: in short, the Art of living. we don’t know, for sure, what 
he would make of the way we are using the riches available to us 
today. but i think we can hazard a guess.
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 ibid.
87 ibid., 16–17.
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2. kEynES: EconoMic poSSibilitiES FoR ouR 
GRandchildREn 
liam halligan 
in 1930, a year on from the wall Street crash, great britain was 
economically shattered. The prosperity of the “Roaring Twenties” 
was already a distant memory, having made way for the stagnation 
of the Thirties. with stock markets slumped across the industrialised 
world, the great Depression had taken hold and would bring 
almost a decade of mass unemployment and despair to the world’s 
most advanced societies. Fascism and communism were on the 
rampage. Capitalism and democracy were under siege.
it was against this background that John Maynard Keynes wrote 
a characteristically defiant essay. in it, he asked the seemingly 
fanciful question: “what can we reasonably expect the level of 
our economic life to be one hundred years hence? what are the 
economic possibilities for our grandchildren?”88
Despite the gloom of the times, Keynes called upon his fellow 
citizens – or at least the academic and political elite to which he 
belonged – to be upbeat, to “take wings into the future” and to 
look forward to a much more prosperous world. “we are suffering 
just now from a bad attack of economic pessimism”, he wrote. “it 
is common to hear people say the epoch of enormous economic 
progress which characterised the 19th century is over; that the rapid 
improvement in the standard of life is now going to slow down.”
There was indeed an emerging consensus in 1930 that the 
great Depression marked the end of a process that had begun 
with the industrial Revolution. After decades of almost continuous 
expansion and rising living standards, western capitalist economies 
88  Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren was first delivered in 1928 and subsequently expanded. The 
entire essay is reprinted in John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion: The Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes, Volume IX (london: Macmillan, 1972), 321–2.
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were seen to be reverting to their historic norm: one of marginal, 
or even zero, growth.
Keynes would have none of it. “i believe this to be a wildly 
mistaken interpretation of what is happening to us”, he boomed. 
“The prevailing world depression, the enormous anomaly of 
unemployment in a world of wants, blinds us to what is going on 
under the surface. … For we are suffering not from the rheumatics 
of old age, but from the growing pains of over-rapid changes.”
Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren argued that the great 
Depression was less a crisis of capitalism than a transition to better 
times. The “advanced societies” of europe and north America, 
Keynes asserted, would soon recover to exhibit even faster 
progress. Stronger growth, when it arrived, would bring more than 
renewed prosperity. Society would reap further dividends, in terms 
of an improved philosophical and moral outlook too.
All this – material wealth and sociological change – would serve 
to justify capitalism. Despite its excesses, and slumps, capitalism – 
rather than any rival system – could “solve the economic problem, 
the struggle for subsistence”. Contrary to many posthumous 
accounts, Keynes was no socialist. only capitalism, he declared, 
could lead us “out of the tunnel of economic necessity, and into 
the daylight”.89
The object of this chapter is to discuss the contemporary 
relevance of Grandchildren – an important polemic, which has been 
over-shadowed by Keynes’s more celebrated work.90 Criticised at 
89  Keynes is routinely mislabelled. Right-wingers, along with most economists, associate him with big-
spending governments, inflation and the “mixed economy” consensus which collapsed during the 1979 
“winter of discontent”. For similar reasons, he is worshipped by many on the left. in fact, the “Keynesian” 
doctrine had less to do with Keynes than with a younger generation of his followers, most notably Alvin 
Hansen in the US and nicholas Kaldor in the UK.
90  by 1930, when he wrote Grandchildren, Keynes had yet to produce The General Theory – his magnum opus. 
Published in 1936, it remains one of the most influential books ever written.
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the time as utopian, Grandchildren has, in some ways, turned out 
to be remarkably prophetic. but, as we shall see, the essay contains 
some crucial analytical flaws. These errors in Keynes’s argument 
go to the heart of some of the most intractable problems we 
face today.
kEynES’S viSion
The central claim in Grandchildren was, at the same time, both 
incredibly audacious and impeccably well founded. As modern 
society’s most serious peacetime crisis raged around him, 
Keynes dusted off his abacus and came up with some long-term 
economic forecasts.
His conclusions, while mesmerising, seemed utterly detached 
from the predicament western society found itself in at the 
beginning of the Thirties. “The standard of living in progressive 
countries one hundred years hence will be between four and eight 
times as high as it is today”, he asserted. “And it would not be foolish 
to contemplate the possibility of far greater progress still.”
Capitalism appeared to be in ruins. events in Russia, germany 
and italy suggested that political revolution, communist or fascist, 
was a genuine possibility. Yet if britain and America stuck with 
liberal capitalism, Keynes argued, great wealth was just around 
the corner. His confident, yet almost outlandish, claim – that the 
“civilised world” was gearing up for renewed prosperity, despite the 
surrounding gloom – was based on two related principles.
The first was that the age of scientific innovation prior to the great 
Depression was a harbinger of even greater productivity gains to 
come. The strong growth achieved during the industrial Revolution 
was largely explained by rapid technological change – “coal, steam, 
electricity, petrol … the methods of mass production, wireless, 
printing … newton, Darwin, einstein and thousands of other things 
well-being
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and men too famous and familiar to catalogue”. Grandchildren foresaw 
not just a continuation, but an acceleration of such trends.
Technology would combine, Keynes predicted, with 
“compound interest” – the exponential expansion of capital over 
time, once it has been suitably invested. “The power of compound 
interest is such”, he said, “as to stagger the imagination.” These two 
providers – innovation and capital accumulation – had already 
secured progress, throughout the industrial Revolution, “on a scale 
far beyond a hundred-fold of what any previous age has known”, 
he wrote. “So, in spite of an enormous growth in the population of 
the world, the average standard of living in europe and the United 
States has been raised.”
There was no reason why this growth in per capita incomes 
shouldn’t continue, Grandchildren argued, given future innovation 
and the expected decline in population growth. “if capital 
increases, say, by 2% per annum, the capital equipment of the 
world will be increased by half in twenty years and seven and 
a half times in a hundred years”, Keynes wrote. “Think of that in 
terms of material goods – houses, transport and the like.” The 
great Depression would then be seen for what it was: “a temporary 
phase of maladjustment”.
Keynes went further. if the capitalist economies held their 
collective nerve, he wrote, they would eventually generate 
enough wealth to “end scarcity”, which in turn would change the 
way people lived. “Hitherto, the economic problem, the struggle 
for subsistence, has been the primary, most pressing problem of 
the human race – not only of the human race in fact, but of the 
whole of the biological kingdom from the beginnings of life in its 
most primitive forms.”
but now capitalism, suitably managed, could create such 
prosperity as to “solve the economic problem”, rescuing huge 
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numbers from the mind-numbing drudgery of the employment 
treadmill. “in days not so very remote”, Keynes predicted, “the 
course of affairs will simply be that there will be ever larger and 
larger classes of people for whom problems of economic necessity 
have been practically removed.”
once this “hump” of scarcity had been overcome, the main 
issue then facing society would be one of extended leisure. “For 
the first time since his creation”, wrote Keynes, “man will be faced 
with his real, his permanent problem – how to use his freedom 
from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which 
science and compound interest have won for him, to live wisely and 
agreeably and well.”
This “abundant leisure” problem could initially be quite serious, 
given mankind’s instinct, “bred into him for countless generations”, 
to stay busy. but the population would eventually settle down to a 
situation of much reduced working hours. in Grandchildren, Keynes 
raised the prospect of “three-hour shifts, or a fifteen-hour week” 
(my italics).
in the here and now, he acknowledged, capitalism was 
unstable, almost iniquitous, and driven by questionable motives. At 
the end of the 1920s, Keynes had become fascinated with Sigmund 
Freud’s reflections on the pathology of money. He concluded 
from Freud that the wealth-generating heart of capitalism was a 
neurosis, calling it “the love of money”. but the system could be 
justified, he argued, as it would eventually produce so much wealth 
that society could let this neurosis go, paving the way to “the good 
life” and “moral transformation”.91
91  As a member of the “educated bourgeoisie” – his own phrase – Keynes was anyway instinctively cool 
towards the idea of commerce, either as a vocation or as the focus of a nation’s pursuits. That didn’t 
stop him from playing the money markets throughout his life, on behalf of himself, his friends and his 
Cambridge college.
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“i see us free, to return to some of the most sure and certain 
principles of religion and traditional virtue”, he wrote. “That avarice 
is a vice, that the exaction of usury is a misdemeanour, and the 
love of money is detestable. we shall value once more ends 
above means and prefer the good to the useful. we shall honour 
those who teach us how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously 
and well.”
So, as the great Depression did its damage, Keynes mapped out 
his vision of a society enjoying a higher state of spiritual well-being, 
released from capitalism’s worst excesses. “when the accumulation 
of wealth is no longer of high social importance”, he wrote, “there 
will be great changes in the code of morals. ... The love of money 
as a possession will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat 
disgusting morbidity.”
To modern readers, such predictions sound far-fetched, even 
whimsical. but it must be appreciated that Grandchildren was 
written for a sophisticated political purpose. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Keynes was presenting a utopia that was neither 
socialist nor communist. it was, in contrast, post-capitalist. At a time 
of great economic and political risk, Grandchildren was an attempt 
to undermine the seductive prospect of political revolution, to 
muffle the siren calls from Moscow.
Keynes wrote Grandchildren to make the case that capitalism, 
given a chance, would be “immensely successful”. what’s more, 
capitalism would also eventually be compatible with moral and 
philosophical health. once prosperity had been delivered, once 
capitalism had worked its scientific and financial magic, we would 
work much less, devote ourselves to non-pecuniary pursuits, and 
become more civilised people. For the most part, we would use our 
wealth to advantage, predicted Keynes, “enjoying the abundance 
when it comes”.
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Why kEynES WaS RiGht – and WRonG
Grandchildren was correct, and incorrect, at the same time. Keynes’s 
bold growth forecasts for 2030 have proved strikingly accurate 
and are well on the way to being fulfilled. but his judgements 
about future lifestyles, and ultimately human nature, were wide 
of the mark. Put bluntly, since 1930, the tremendous wealth 
spurt he predicted under capitalism has taken place. The “moral 
transformation” of society has not.
As Grandchildren went to press, the world’s major economies 
were, indeed, in the early stages of a productivity boom that would 
eventually reap unprecedented commercial dividends. in that sense, 
Keynes was prescient. between 1930 and 1973, when this boom 
fizzled out, US income per head almost quadrupled – even when 
adjusted for inflation. it is now more than six times greater than when 
Keynes made his projections.92 it’s a similar story in the UK – real per 
capita income is now 4.5 times greater than in 1930.
So, given the power of exponential growth, Keynes’s bold forecasts 
could well be met by 2030 – within his 100-year limit. Strictly speaking, 
his detailed calculations stressed compound interest too much, and 
technology too little. but his basic economic analysis – almost heretical at 
the time – has turned out to be sound. The 1930s were, as he said at their 
outset, merely a dip in an established and continuing trend of sustained 
growth and rising average living standards across capitalist societies.
Having said that, Keynes’s microeconomic forecasts were 
seriously off-target. A large part of Grandchildren dealt with the 
difficulties of adjusting to a life of abundant leisure. in general, 
working hours in western societies have fallen since 1930, as Keynes 
said they would, but only rather slowly. And as figure 1 shows, since 
1960, hours worked in the US have started rising again.
92 T. liesner, One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics (london: The economist Publications, 1987).
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Figure 1: annual hours worked per person employed  
(trends 1913–2001)
Source: A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective (Paris: oeCD, 2001) and A. Maddison, Monitoring 
the World Economy 1820–1992 (Paris: oeCD, 1995)
in addition, the pace of the decline in working hours in the UK 
and even France has been slower since 1960 than it was during 
the previous three decades. All this suggests that Keynes’s nirvana 
of “abundant leisure” may never be reached and at best remains 
distant. So, despite three-quarters of a century of exponential 
growth, Keynes’s prediction of a 15-hour working week by 2030 has 
turned out to be wrong.
in contrast to Keynes’s fears of a “general nervous breakdown” due 
to a lack of work, many western employees feel they now work 
too much. His warnings in Grandchildren of “fearful problems for 
ordinary people, with no special talents, to occupy themselves” 
today sound rather odd. “ever larger classes of people” have 
not been released, as he said they would, from the “problems 
of economic necessity”. Meeting basic needs – food, housing, 
transport – still accounts for a large part of the majority of workers’ 
budgets, even in “advanced societies”, just as in 1930.
There are several reasons for this. Some necessities, such as housing, 
are now relatively more expensive, because they are of superior 
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quality. People work further from home, so transport costs have risen 
too. while Grandchildren implicitly assumed away any rise in inequality, 
gains from the growth that Keynes foresaw have been heavily skewed 
towards the top fifth of the income distribution. And, since the 1970s, 
for many workers, hourly pay increases have lagged behind inflation.93 
All this has meant that incomes in the majority of households have 
only been maintained in real terms, despite a growth in general 
prosperity, by continuing to work long hours.
but we are missing something. A crucial reason we still work 
so much, eschewing the leisure that wealth and technology 
have made possible, was touched on in Grandchildren but then 
not developed. Keynes distinguished between absolute needs – 
food, clothing, shelter – and relative needs – those “we feel only if 
their satisfaction lifts us above, and makes us feel superior to, our 
fellows”. He went on to argue, though, that “a point would soon be 
reached, much sooner perhaps than all of us are aware, when our 
absolute needs are satisfied, in the sense that we prefer to devote 
our further energies to non-economic purposes”.
As it turns out, the vast majority of us do not “prefer to devote our 
further energies to non-economic purposes”. This was Keynes’s crucial 
mistake. we have instead chained ourselves to what psychologists 
now call the “hedonic treadmill” – the modern tendency to spend 
increased wealth not in the form of more leisure, but of yet more 
consumption. This extra spending is largely relative – carried out 
simply to “keep up with the Joneses” or, if possible, outdo them.
Grandchildren acknowledges relative needs “may indeed be 
insatiable, for the higher the general level, the higher still they are”. 
but Keynes underplayed the extent to which they would shape 
contemporary lives. The work-earn-spend culture, while present in 
93  David ellwood, “The Sputtering labour Force of the 21st Century: Can Social Policy Help?”, National Bureau 
of Economic Research (nbeR), working Paper 8321(nbeR, 2001).
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his day, has since escalated to become a way of life. A considerable 
slice of the extra wealth we have accrued since 1930 has gone on 
products deemed to be necessities, but which are nothing of 
the sort.
Flat-screen televisions, DVD recorders and polyphonic mobile 
phones are only the latest and most conspicuous examples. For 
several generations now, we have routinely worked obsessively, 
borrowed too much money and neglected our families in an 
attempt to finance mundane consumption. Keynes did not foresee 
our “must have” culture, but the continued existence of long hours, 
and terrifying rise of consumer indebtedness, is driven in part by 
the mindless pursuit of relative, not absolute, needs.
an unhappy SociEty?
given all this, it is no surprise that Keynes’s “great change in the 
code of morals” has not happened either. These days, we have 
neither the time nor the mental capacity to cultivate “the good 
life”. The point is well illustrated by a single startling fact. Surveys 
from the major developed countries show that despite a steady rise 
in national incomes since 1950, the proportion of those reporting 
themselves to be “happy” has, at best, been constant and, if 
anything, has fallen.94 There is now compelling academic research 
showing the weakness of the link between rising income and 
subjective “happiness”. The pursuit of greater – or even constant – 
well-being, in the “advanced economies” at least, now requires a lot 
more than increased wealth.95
94  See, for instance, Andrew oswald, “Happiness and economic Performance”, Economic Journal 107 (1997): 
1815–31, and bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect 
Human Well-being (Princeton and oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002).
95  Researchers find that in developing countries, “extra income” alone is still closely related to “happiness”. 
Clearly, when you are on or below the breadline, money can of course be the difference between life and 
death. but above even relatively modest income levels – around $15,000 per capita – the relationship 
between more money and more happiness breaks down. See John Helliwell, “How’s life? Combining 
individual and national Variables to explain Subjective well-being”, National Bureau of Economic Research 
(nbeR), working Paper 9065 (nbeR, 2001).
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it may be that once “scarcity” has been conquered, reported 
“happiness” levels are bound to stagnate given rising expectations. 
but related statistics on proxy measures of unhappiness in western 
societies point to something more disturbing. over the past 
four decades, clinical depression and alcoholism in advanced 
economies have risen on average threefold – despite strong 
growth and huge falls in absolute poverty.96 Crime has similarly 
exploded by a factor of between four and five.97
So, the growth Keynes correctly predicted has failed to bring 
about the rapid reduction in working hours and the “moral 
transformation” he also foresaw. Capitalism has produced rising 
incomes but more criminality and anxiety too. our long-hours 
culture – along with hurry sickness, “yuppie syndrome”, poor 
mental health and the alarming dependence on anti-depressants 
which goes with it – is closely related to an obsession with relative 
consumption which Keynes failed to appreciate.98
So, Grandchildren was correct to argue that economic growth 
could free a prosperous society from constant struggle, but it was 
wrong to suggest it would. Keynes did not predict that modern 
society could still fail to take advantage of such lavish material 
gains, even if the economy succeeded in creating them.
The essay urged us to follow a path where we “cultivate the art 
of life” – rather than communism, on the one hand, or blind wealth 
96  eric Fombonne, in Psychosocial Disorders in Young People – Time Trends and their Causes, ed. Michael Rutter 
and David Smith (new York and Chichester: John wiley, 1995).
97  David Smith, in Psychosocial Disorders, ed. Rutter and Smith. This point about the contemporary rise in 
crime is also made by Professor Richard layard of the london School of economics in his 2003 lionel 
Robbins lectures entitled Happiness: Has Social Science Got a Clue? “it is no good blaming economic growth 
in general (for rising depression, alcoholism and crime),” says layard, “as in some earlier period of economic 
growth like 1850–1914, alcoholism and crime both fell.”
98  This was a serious omission by Keynes. As early as the turn of the century, the American economist 
Thorstein Veblen had pointed out that goods were acquired for status reasons as well as material ones, 
and that in increasingly affluent societies status was likely to play an even greater role in consumption 
decisions. See a discussion of Veblen’s 1899 work, Theory of the Leisure Class, in Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein 
Veblen and His America (new York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1961). 
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accumulation on the other. but growing richer, far from freeing us 
from Keynes’s “love of money” neurosis, has caused it to grow more 
intense. we have more wealth, but we are still working long hours 
and, if anything, are less happy; so what can we do about it? 
“thE aRt oF liFE itSElF”
How can we reduce our workloads, worry less and enjoy life more? 
what are the economic levers we can pull to make all of us – our 
children and grandchildren included – happier at work, at home 
and in retirement? Keynes’s “age of abundant leisure” has yet to 
arrive for most of us, and will probably never do so. but, in that 
context, what can we realistically do to meet the challenge he set 
in Grandchildren – to “cultivate the art of life itself”?
Across the western world, working hours have fallen since 1930, 
though much more slowly than Keynes predicted. And despite 
this fall, large numbers of british men and women are caught in a 
long-hours culture that is almost unique in europe. Full-time british 
employees now work on average 44 hours a week, compared to 
40 hours across the european Union.99 The situation is particularly 
acute for men. in the UK, 56% of men work more than 40 hours 
a week and 27% more than 50 hours – not including travel time. 
Almost 10% work more than 60 hours, double the proportion in 
1992.100 The long-hours problem is most prevalent among the 
professional classes. A recent institute of Management Survey of 
5,000 british managers found that 77% routinely worked beyond 
contracted hours. 
why do we do it? Part of the story is the relative consumption 
urge – which, as we have said, Keynes underestimated. but another 
99  european Commission, The Social Situation in the European Union 2003 (belgium: office for official 
Publications of the european Communities, 2003).
100  Kate bishop and the institute of Management, “working Time Patterns in the UK, France, Denmark and 
Sweden”, Labour Market Trends 112, no. 3 (2004), 113–22.
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major factor behind long hours is the rise of insecurity right across 
the workforce, provoked by globalisation and the endless quest for 
“efficiency”. The recession of the early 1980s produced a “shake-
out” of workers in textiles, manufacturing and other traditional 
industries. The recession of the early 1990s, in turn, resulted in 
“corporate down-sizing” as companies culled ranks of white-
collar employees in a bid to be “competitive”. both of these were 
necessary at the time, but have continued ever since.
now that globalisation has banished the “job for life” to the 
dustbin of history, increasing numbers of us are at the mercy of 
short-term contracts and revolving-door employment policies. in 
this context, a “culture of anxiety” has developed which goes a long 
way towards explaining our work obsession, particularly among 
the middle classes, and particularly in the UK.101 That is because 
our labour laws are the most “flexible” of nearly all industrialised 
countries. Millions of professionals live in fear of the financial and 
social trauma of being “down-sized”. work has becomes less about 
earning a living than about striving for promotion and desperately 
seeking recognition. in search of the job security our parents took 
for granted, more and more of us feel we have to live for work, or 
be seen to do so. This is time-consuming and incredibly stressful.
The scientific advances Keynes thought would extend our 
leisure are in some ways making matters worse. Technology 
makes paranoid employees “over-available”, blurring the boundary 
between home and work. Mobile phones and broadband mean that 
many of us, in virtual terms, never leave the office. Then there is the 
curse of email, encouraging the circulation of useless information 
we feel we must read, even if we have to do so at home. Many 
professionals dread holidays, and even days off, given the huge “in-
box” they will face on return to work. it is hardly surprising, but 
101  i owe this phrase to Matthew Symonds, Culture of Anxiety: Middle Class Crisis (london: The Social Market 
Foundation, 1994). Symonds deliberately echoed the title of J.K. galbraith’s 1992 book, The Culture of 
Contentment, which had described, in contrast, a secure and contented middle class.
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deeply worrying, that computer companies now produce sand-
proof lap-tops for use on the beach!
if capitalism is to lead us “out of the tunnel of economic 
necessity, and into the daylight”, then, as Keynes argued, its rough 
edges sometimes need to be smoothed. we need to reconsider 
the benefits of our super-flexible labour market. The UK needed 
to shake up its labour market and, over the past 20 years, has done 
so in spades. but britain is no longer the “sick man of europe”. 
Restrictive practices have generally been purged and middle 
managers, for the most part, pull their weight. Yet the endless 
pursuit of more and more flexibility remains, for our corporate 
and financial elite, an ideological right. The social implications – in 
terms of pointlessly long hours, ill-health and unhappiness – are 
incalculable and growing. 
A generation of economists has pushed for more flexible 
markets, thus encouraging people to move between jobs and 
homes as if that was an end in itself. At some point, markets become 
flexible enough – everything else is just hubris. As Keynes said, we 
now need to “take wings into the future” and have the confidence 
to strike a more humane balance. And if our grandchildren are to 
benefit, we need to start now.
our work-obsessed culture damages families too. Three-quarters 
of UK managers feel that long hours undermine relationships with 
partners, children and friends.102 This is the route to societal ruin, 
given the overwhelming evidence that companionship is the key to 
genuine happiness.103 our need for it is a biological reality, hard-wired 
into us. So the effect of long hours on separation and divorce rates, 
and absentee parenting, should be taken very seriously indeed.
102 Chartered Management institute Survey, 29 June 2004.
103  David blanchflower and Andrew oswald, “well-being over Time in britain and the USA”, Journal of Public 
Economics 88 (2004): 1359–86.
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in the UK, well-being at home is also damaged by financial 
strains imposed by the price of the home itself. Keynes predicted 
that the relative cost of purchasing necessities would rapidly fall, 
but this has not happened, largely because of high housing costs. 
in many parts of the country, it now typically takes two workers – 
and perhaps three jobs – to establish and run a home. That places 
undue stress on family structures and wider society.
not so long ago, around half the adult population – mostly 
women – worked without pay to maintain home and community, 
performing a fundamental, if often under-valued, role. The high 
cost of housing means that today, for many families of child-rearing 
age, the idea of one stay-at-home parent is no longer an option. 
if both parents are working long hours, child and home care are 
often left undone, or are hired out. in some cases, this works well. 
in others, it seriously damages family and community structures.
concluSion
The central assertion in Grandchildren – that the western world has 
the financial and scientific potential to overcome economic scarcity, 
freeing society’s “moral and material energies” for more uplifting 
pursuits – is even more irrefutable today than it was in 1930.
Yet, since Keynes wrote this essay, we have ended neither want 
nor squalor, even in the “advanced societies”. we have produced 
the wealth, but failed to fashion the “great change in the code of 
morals”. Much of the prosperity, lavished upon us by technology 
and compound interest, has been squandered on meaningless 
relative consumption. but, of course, besieging ourselves with 
possessions is not the same thing as contentment.
in some senses, it is not surprising that we have fallen short 
of Keynes’s vision. given the context in which it was written, 
Grandchildren was perhaps deliberately over-optimistic. The 
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growth predictions were accurate – true to his mathematical 
training, Keynes took no liberties with the arithmetic. but his 
description of a future capitalist society – with its “agreeable” 
living and “15-hour weeks” – was as much an attempt to 
counter bolshevik propaganda as it was an exercise in serious 
economic forecasting.
Having said that, whatever Keynes’s contemporary political 
aims, his essay still holds lessons for today and for our grandchildren. 
Almost a century of exponential growth has, for the most part, 
raised our incomes, but not our happiness. This suggests that 
conventional measures of economic progress – such as gross 
national product, or gnP – should be challenged. when the vast 
bulk of the population is clothed, housed and reasonably well fed, 
and extra consumption is of little value, real improvements need to 
be measured, at least partly, by how people actually feel.
The study and pursuit of “well-being”, still ridiculed by many 
economists and politicians, is often dismissed with reference to 
human nature. because we are competitive beings, the argument 
goes, happiness and self-esteem will always depend on relative 
income and rank. on that basis, however well-off we all are, large 
chunks of the population are destined to be unhappy. 
but this ignores the role of companionship, which makes 
people happier but does not depend on income. it disregards the 
importance of policies, be they properly ring-fenced working hours 
or more realistic house prices, which help parents spend more time 
with their children and with each other. even if happiness does 
depend partly on relative income, it depends on so much more than 
this – a notion at the heart of Grandchildren and which has been 
proved by the data ever since. by urging “moral transformation”, 
by calling on us to “value once more ends above means” and “the 
good to the useful”, Keynes was ramming home his most powerful 
point – income isn’t enough.
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Grandchildren looks forward to a time when “we shall be able 
to rid ourselves of many of the principles that have hag-ridden 
us for two hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the 
most distasteful of human qualities into the position of the highest 
virtues”. Keynes is at his most effective in this essay when he is 
challenging the “love of money” – arguing against the endless 
pursuit of wealth, rank and possessions.
on that basis, mature capitalist societies need to reconcile 
material gain with other forms of progress. it is not good enough 
to measure our prosperity using gnP, simply adding up everything 
we make, sell and buy. we need to design and promote yardsticks 
which include how secure people feel – in their relationships, 
employment and retirement. we should include measures of 
human capital growth, given that “up-skilling”, not “down-sizing”, 
is the only long-term response to the global challenges we face. 
Progress towards environmental objectives should be given a 
heavy weighting too.
Until all these criteria are included in our measures of success, 
alongside immediate aggregate wealth, incentives will be skewed 
away from outcomes that do the most to improve our lives. in a 
post-industrial society – where income gains do least to generate 
welfare – progress is also about safeguarding the values, morals 
and community structures that years of capitalism have begun 
to challenge.
That is the most important lesson of Grandchildren. Capitalism 
should be our servant and not our master. economic prosperity is 
a prerequisite of well-being, but if that is all life is about, we will 
end up exhausted and disillusioned. The longer we continue down 
the path of “growth at all costs”, the more damage we do – to 
ourselves, and to the social, moral and environmental inheritance 
we bequeath to our grandchildren.
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3. cRoSland and happinESS
kevin hickson
The idea of happiness rather than growth or efficiency as the most 
fundamental objective of policy is an appealing one. Academic 
concern with happiness has been revived in recent years by the 
work of Richard layard, who has resurrected the utilitarian tradition. 
other chapters in this volume deal with a series of thinkers who were 
primarily academics and who had a direct and powerful impact 
on the development of politics. This chapter is slightly different 
in the sense that it is concerned not with a political or economic 
theorist but with a political intellectual: Tony Crosland (1918-1977) 
who was a social democratic theorist and labour MP and served in 
several Cabinet positions in the 1964-70 and 1974-9 governments, 
culminating in a short period as Foreign Secretary before his early 
death.104 The fact that Tony Crosland is still considered worthy 
of inclusion in a book of this type is perhaps a mixed blessing. 
it is positive in the sense that the work of Crosland is the most 
sophisticated exposition of socialist or social democratic - Crosland 
used the terms interchangeably - theory in britain since 1945, if not 
of the last century. but is also highlights the fact that no-one has 
yet managed to provide as coherent or comprehensive a case for 
socialism as that set out in The Future of Socialism.105
The chapter begins with a summary of the main arguments 
made by Crosland. it then proceeds to ask if happiness should be 
the primary objective of social democratic politics. The argument 
presented here is that it although it is an appealing notion it does 
not provide an adequate basis for social democratic aspirations 
of equality and redistribution, which instead should be more 
concerned with the extension of rights and the maximisation of 
the sum of liberty. Finally, the chapter asks what should be the 
104  There are two biographies on Crosland. S. Crosland, Tony Crosland (london: Cape, 1982) and K. Jefferys, 
Anthony Crosland: A New Biography (london: Cohen, 1999)
105 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (new York: Schocken, 1963, first published in 1956)
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proper relationship between social democracy, economic growth 
and happiness.
cRoSland’S thESiS
writing to his friend Philip williams during the Second world war, 
Crosland expressed his belief that he would produce a major 
work of socialist theory and would establish himself as the new 
bernstein, the german revisionist socialist who had published his 
book Evolutionary Socialism in 1899.106 This volume was The Future 
of Socialism first published in 1956. The timing was important in 
that it was written as a contribution to the debate between the 
left and right of the labour Party. As a follower of Hugh gaitskell, 
who had been elected leader of the labour Party the previous 
year, Crosland wanted to justify the move away from what the 
left of the Party regarded as the fundamental socialist objective 
of nationalisation. Crosland was also the first person to produce a 
comprehensive review of socialism after the downfall of the labour 
government in 1951.
Crosland believed he had identified three decisive trends in the 
economy which had not only disproved the central assumptions of 
Marxist theory, but also the pre-war socialist arguments upon which 
he believed it had been largely based. All three trends marked a 
shift of power away from the capitalist class. Firstly, there was a 
shift of power away from owners to the state. This was partly due to 
the nationalisation measures of the Attlee government (which had 
nationalised roughly 20% of industry between 1945 and 1951) but 
was largely due to the use of Keynesian economic management, 
which had given the state sufficient powers to be able to co-
ordinate economic activity and thereby ensure a long-term higher 
rate of economic growth. Secondly, there had also been a transfer 
106  e. bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism (new York: Schocken, 1975, first published 1899). Crosland’s 
correspondence is located in the Crosland archive in the british library of Political and economic Science, 
london.
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of power away from owners to workers in the form of trade unions, 
which were historically large and were operating within a condition 
of full employment which would allow for free collective wage 
bargaining. Finally, there has also been a clear shift of power away 
from owners to managers in the sense that the average size of the 
corporate unit had increased substantially from that which existed 
when Marx was writing and in consequence the power of owners, 
who now took the form of dispersed shareholders, had diminished. 
effective control of private corporations, Crosland argued, rested 
with a managerial class, which could also consider non-profit 
motives in making business decisions. 
There are two points of significance to this analysis. The first is 
that Crosland was utilising recent academic research including berle 
and Means, who first argued that control and ownership within the 
corporation were divorced, and James burnham, who talked of the 
emergence of a corporate managerial class. Secondly, writing in the 
1950s Crosland believed that these changes were permanent and 
could not be undone by a future Conservative government. The 
Conservative Party had undergone significant adaptation after its 
defeat in 1945 and its right-wing had been marginalised. Crosland 
did not anticipate the counter-revolution of the 1980s. indeed, he 
doubted if contemporary society was any longer capitalist.
in light of such trends Crosland believed that it was necessary 
to reconsider what socialism meant. in particular, the objective of 
further extensive public ownership as advanced by the labour 
left was no longer relevant. instead, Crosland advocated a number 
of policies, which he believed would be sufficient to turn britain 
into a socialist country. Firstly, Keynesian economic techniques 
that would allow for higher rates of economic growth required to 
finance the expansion of the welfare state. Secondly, fiscal reform 
to tackle wealth inequality in particular, since this was an area he 
believed where the previous labour government had not done 
enough. A future labour government should therefore implement 
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such things as a wealth tax, inheritance tax and capital gains tax in 
order to address inequality of wealth. Finally, Crosland believed that 
priority should be attached to education reform including opening 
up public schools to non-fee paying students and replacing of 
grammar schools with comprehensives.
This policy framework, Crosland maintained, would be sufficient 
to achieve socialism in britain since it would increase equality. 
while the britain of the 1950s was no longer capitalist due to the 
culmination of the trends identified earlier, it was not yet socialist. 
The Keynesian welfare state was insufficient since widespread 
inequalities persisted. Crosland’s understanding of equality was 
particularly profound. by equality Crosland meant three things. 
The first was equality of opportunity, which was more desirable 
than its absence, but by itself would not in his terms be ‘enough’. it 
would not be enough since the persistence of economic and social 
inequalities meant that there were unequal starting points that the 
idea of meritocracy did not consider adequately. Market outcomes 
would be determined not just on merit but also by brute luck – 
the family an individual was born into, genetic inheritance and 
so forth, which were beyond the control of the individual. Market 
outcomes were therefore unfair because they disproportionately 
benefited the successful and penalised the unsuccessful. it was 
therefore necessary to move beyond equal opportunity by doing 
two things. The second was that meaningful equality could 
not be realised without greater redistribution of income and 
wealth: hence the need for the fiscal stance outlined by Crosland, 
including wealth taxation. Finally, inequality was not just a matter 
of economics in britain but also had a distinctive social aspect. The 
social importance of differences of manners, accents and so forth 
associated with social class also needed to be addressed if britain 
was to be more genuinely egalitarian.
it is in coming to the ethical justification for such a policy 
that the role of utilitarianism comes in to play and this will be 
well-being
59
discussed in the next section. but first one further issue needs 
to be discussed, which is the value of such an analysis. it would 
seem from a contemporary perspective that Crosland was far too 
optimistic in The Future of Socialism. indeed, he was criticised at the 
time for being so from some quarters, most notably by the post-
war labour Minister, John Strachey, who had himself moved a 
long way from his pre-war communism, but continued to believe 
that public ownership remained of crucial importance to the 
pursuit of socialism and said so in a critical review of Crosland’s 
magnum opus.107 Moreover, Crosland can be criticised for failing to 
understand how national polities can be constrained by the power 
of international capitalism. This became a more central objection 
to Crosland’s thesis by the 1970s. Crosland himself revised his 
position substantially and as early as the 1960s had started to 
question his more optimistic claims about high growth. in a review 
of the wilson government’s economic record Crosland was very 
critical of the sacrifice of economic growth targets contained in the 
national Plan in an attempt to defend the parity of sterling before 
being forced to devalue in 1967. However, he remained committed 
to his belief that with sufficient political will governments could 
achieve the economic growth required to meet welfare objectives. 
He believed that the failure of the wilson government was one 
of political will rather than the triumph of international capitalism 
over a national government. Again, the left regarded this as naïve, 
and recommended a policy of national economic protectionism 
as part of an Alternative economic Strategy.108 if anything the 
power of global capitalism, perceived or real, to constrain national 
governments has increased since the 1970s and new labour have 
justified the framing of a moderate economic policy in such terms 
until the recent economic crisis has, perhaps, forced a rethink.
107  See the chapters on Crosland and Strachey in M. beech and K. Hickson, Labour’s Thinkers: The Intellectual 
Roots of Labour from Tawney to Gordon Brown (london: Tauris, 2007).
108 For a discussion of the Alternative economic Strategy see the chapter on Stuart Holland in ibid.
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thE juStiFication FoR Equality
it is in examining the ethical basis of socialism that Crosland’s 
thesis is ambiguous. Crosland appears to have been influenced 
by the political philosophy of AJ Ayer who argued that morality 
was essentially subjective and therefore that there was no way 
of determining objectively the ethical superiority of one form of 
moral argument over another. Crosland appears to have accepted 
this when he claimed that all he could do was to outline why 
he believed in equality and that it was then up to the reader to 
determine for him or herself if these arguments were convincing. 
Certainly the alleged influence of Ayer has been cited by a number 
of commentators on Crosland starting with the economist, John 
Vaizey.109 Some writers believed this placed social democracy in 
an especially vulnerable position when faced by the economic 
liberal arguments of Hayek, who claimed that his ideas were 
morally superior to opposing points of view. it was therefore left to 
commentators in the 1980s to reformulate social democracy in the 
face of the Hayekian challenge.110
Crosland presented three such arguments to justify equality. 
The first of these is social waste – that inequality wasted a lot of 
the natural talents of the nation by holding back the successful. 
This argument was almost the opposing one to the economic 
liberal claim that inequality was needed to provide incentives 
for entrepreneurs to thrive. Crosland accepted the need for 
incentives and was rather cautious on the issue of income tax 
since he believed that since the top rate was then close to 70% 
britain was at this time close to the point where its tax regime 
would start to act as a disincentive. However, his argument 
is some way removed from the economic liberal case since 
109 J. Vaizey, In Breach of Promise (london: weidenfield and nicolson, 1983)
110  See the chapter on Roy Hattersley in beech and Hickson, ibid. Also see R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom: The 
Future of Democratic Socialism (london: Penguin, 1987) for a clear example of socialist literature at this time 
from the then Deputy leader of the labour Party.
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he believed that incentives could be combined with greater 
equality than existed in the 1950s, especially in the form of social 
equality and greater equality of wealth, as discussed above. The 
criterion that should underpin such a redistributive strategy was 
‘the rent of ability’ which would allow for rewards to those who 
contributed to the well-being of society. This was rather similar 
to the ‘difference principle’ later stated by Rawls: that the pattern 
of distribution should be such that inequality is to the advantage 
of the least advantaged. The rewards of top earners would be 
made accountable to the wider wishes and needs of society and 
not just what they could get in the market – an issue of much 
contemporary significance at the time of writing this chapter due 
to numerous cases of substantial financial rewards being given 
to senior executives despite clear cases of business failure. The 
second justification, and one related to the example just given, 
was that greater equality would diminish social resentment. 
Crosland believed that social resentment was especially marked 
in britain and was valid due to the absence of meaningful 
equality of opportunity and the unfair rewards from the market 
that followed from it.
This brings us to the issue of social justice, which was the third 
justification for equality. There can be several ways in which a 
claim to social justice can be legitimately made. Socialist and social 
democrats have put forward several kinds of arguments here. The 
first set relates social justice to greater happiness, although this is 
not a defence Crosland chose to make. it has been commonplace 
in socialist and social democratic literature to justify social justice 
in terms of utility. Hence, in 1952 Roy Jenkins, later labour Home 
Secretary and founding member of the SDP, claimed in the New 
Fabian Essays that: 
A modicum of redistribution would obviously have increased 
the total welfare of the individuals who made up the nation. 
The liberal view that every individual had an equal right to seek 
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his own happiness and the Marshallian concept of diminishing 
marginal utility, amounted, between them, to a very strong 
levelling case.111
writing over twenty years later in the 1970s, the American 
progressive thinker, Christopher Jencks, made a similar utilitarian 
argument for redistribution, by arguing that:
If we want to maximise the satisfaction of the population, the best 
way to divide any given amount of income is to make everyone’s 
income the same. Income disparities…will always reduce average 
satisfactions, because individuals with low incomes will lose more 
than individuals with high incomes gain.112
The case for redistribution was therefore simple. if 1% of income 
was taken away from the person receiving £100,000 per year and 
given to the person receiving £10,000 per year then the there 
would be an increase in the sum of utility since the satisfaction 
derived from additional income diminishes. The poorer person 
would gain utility greater than the loss of utility suffered by the rich 
person. Redistribution was therefore more efficient in the sense of 
increasing the sum of utility. The more unequal a society the less 
utility there would be overall.
The empirical problem with this argument was highlighted by 
Crosland.113 in order to raise the level of the poorest substantially 
there would need to be very high levels of taxation on the rich and, 
as noted above, Crosland argued that income tax above 70% would 
provide a disincentive. Fiscal redistribution would therefore need 
to bring in a much wider share of the electorate including those on 
middling incomes. This issue is still relevant today. even though it 
111 R. Jenkins, ‘equality’ in R.H.S. Crossman (ed.) New Fabian Essays (london: Turnstile, 1952), p.70
112 C. Jencks et.al, Inequality (london: Allen lane, 1973), pp.9-10
113 Crosland, The Future of Socialism, pp.123-4
well-being
63
should be more possible to close tax loopholes than is sometimes 
suggested, a higher rate of income tax on those earning six figure 
salaries - which would include senior academics, surgeons and 
some head-teachers - may not necessarily raise enough revenue to 
significantly alter the incomes of the poorest.
but even if it was deemed possible to use income tax to redistribute 
wealth, then it would still not meet a further, philosophical objection 
to a utility-based conception of social justice.114 bentham believed 
it was possible to objectively measure our preferences in what he 
termed the ‘felicific calculus’. This was a type of cost-benefit analysis, 
such as that used to reach policy outcomes like the construction of 
a new road or airport runway, where financial costs and projected 
benefits are weighted alongside non-financial costs and benefits 
such as pollution, the destruction of local nature sites and so forth.
However, this is problematic as a philosophical device for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, it may not be possible to objectively 
measure our own preferences at any given time due to the 
presence of uncertainty – we often make decisions in the dark, or 
at least without the full facts being available and no certainty as 
to the full consequences of any action. Secondly, i would argue 
that even if it were possible to calculate with complete certainty 
our own preferences it is not possible to determine with any 
degree of accuracy comparative preferences. it is perfectly possible 
to conceive of a situation where the rich person can derive more 
utility from the retention of his or her final 1% of income in order 
to purchase a yacht or take a luxury holiday than the poorer person 
would gain in being able to use that additional 1% on the weekly 
grocery shop. in saying that redistribution of income and wealth 
increases the overall level of utility, therefore, the socialist actually 
places the policy-maker in an impossible situation since there is no 
way of knowing if redistribution will increase the sum of happiness.
114 i owe these thoughts to Raymond Plant. R. Plant, Modern Political Thought (oxford: blackwell, 1991)
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Happiness should not therefore be the guiding principle 
that underpins the idea of social justice. in saying this, it is not 
my intention to argue that socialism should not be concerned 
with increasing the sum of happiness and there are now several 
indicators of happiness and well-being that were not present 
when Crosland wrote. but it should not be the explicit objective of 
socialist policy for the reasons outlined. if it was to be the explicit 
objective then it places socialism in a weak position intellectually.
thE liMitS oF utility 
instead the principles underpinning social justice and redistribution 
should be liberty and rights.115 liberty is here understood in its 
positive form – that is freedom to rather than freedom from. economic 
liberals such as Hayek sought to dismiss the positive conception 
of liberty (believing that it implied an infinite demand on the 
resources of the state) since there were unlimited human wants, each 
demanding resources with no way to decide objectively between 
them.116 The result would be government overload as occurred, or so 
they claimed, in the 1970s as the welfare state grew in an attempt to 
meet the unlimited demands that had been placed on it. A governing 
system, as witnessed in britain after 1945, which was based on trying 
to ensure that a positive conception of liberty was maintained 
would lead to extensive pressure group competition and a state of 
ungovernability. in contrast a negative conception of liberty, meaning 
that individuals are free so long as they are not subject to coercion, 
would be resource neutral, since it would best be achieved in the 
competitive marketplace, where individuals can choose where to 
work and to spend their money relatively free from the constraints of 
taxation and regulation, which are in essence coercive.
115  Again, my thinking on these issues has been shaped by numerous discussions with Raymond Plant. 
in addition to the above book see also R. Plant Equality, Markets and the State (london: Fabian Society, 
1984) and K. Hoover and R. Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States: A Critical Appraisal 
(london: Routledge, 1989).
116  For Hayek’s thoughts on these and other issues see his book The Constitution of Liberty (london: Routledge, 
1960)
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The counter-argument of social democrats is that the negative 
conception of liberty does not make sense. The academic and 
labour peer, Raymond Plant, expressed this most clearly in asking 
the question what is liberty for? The answer was self-evidently to be 
able to do things, thus implying the positive conception of liberty 
– the freedom to act. if this argument is accepted then the aim 
of redistribution can be more usefully expressed as the increase 
in the sum of liberty. it is more convincing to say that a policy of 
greater equality can increase the sum of liberty. Some liberties can 
be considered more fundamental than others and redistribution 
will allow those more fundamental liberties to be realised. For 
example, we said before how it is difficult to be certain that by 
redistributing 1% of income from the rich person to the poor person 
an increase in utility will result, since it is feasible that the purchase 
of a yacht can derive more utility for the rich person than the same 
additional income can satisfy the poorer person’s ability to spend 
more on weekly necessities. but it would seem convincing to many 
that the freedom to purchase decent quality groceries is a more 
fundamental liberty than the freedom to buy a yacht so in a very 
clear way we can see how the sum of liberty has been increased. it 
may or may not be the case that the sum of happiness has increased 
after this redistributive act but the sum of liberty has increased.
An allied concept is that of rights. Again, economic liberals 
sought to argue that there was a clear distinction to be drawn 
between negative and positive rights. The right not to be killed 
or assaulted was non-resource dependent and could therefore be 
seen as an objective right. in contrast, positive (or welfare) rights 
were resource dependent and were therefore not to be considered 
objective rights. The right to welfare was dependent upon the 
capacity of the government to provide such rights and was 
therefore less of a right and more of a gift to be bestowed should 
the government of the day wish to do so. Just as with the positive 
conception of liberty, so to the positive conception of rights would 
lead to overload as the unlimited claims of those who demanded 
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this ‘right’ to welfare would mount up and drain the resources of 
the state. However, it is possible to defend the positive conception 
of rights since all forms of rights depend on, and are limited by, the 
resources needed to enforce those rights. This was true of positive 
as well as negative rights – the need to resource the police, courts 
etc – and so there was no categorical distinction to be drawn 
between these two forms of rights. Again, rights provide a more 
solid philosophical basis for social justice and redistribution. To use 
the example given above once more we can say, and again there 
would appear to be a social consensus on this issue, that the right 
to food, shelter, basic income etc, are more fundamental than the 
‘right’ to a yacht. A more equal distribution of income and wealth 
would therefore result in basic rights being met.
SocialiSM and abundancE
So far i have argued that equality and social justice are justified 
more convincingly with reference to rights and liberty than to utility. 
The remainder of this chapter deals with other issues relevant to a 
Croslandite conception of happiness.
As mentioned above, Crosland placed great emphasis 
on economic growth and believed that Keynesian economic 
techniques were sufficient to achieve it. He was to be disappointed 
and was to express this in his later work. However, there are several 
other pertinent issues in relation to economic growth which need 
to be discussed here. The first is that Crosland placed such emphasis 
on economic growth not only because he was sceptical about the 
possibility of further significant redistribution of income without 
undermining incentives but also because he believed that there was 
a natural tendency within society to oppose direct measures of fiscal 
redistribution. The rich were not prepared to see a deterioration in 
their absolute position and so the only way of achieving a ‘levelling-
up’ strategy of improving the relative position of the poor while 
maintaining the absolute position of the better off would be 
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through sustained economic growth. what was not predicted was 
the appeal of the economic liberal policy of improving both the 
absolute and the relative position of the rich, as occurred between 
1979 and 1997. This counter-strategy clearly highlighted the need for 
a moral case for redistribution, as outlined above.
Crosland’s desire to see higher rates of economic growth also 
came under attack from two quarters. The labour left believed that 
in promoting economic growth, Crosland was also encouraging 
materialism. This was argued not least because of the fact that 
the final chapter of The Future of Socialism is dedicated to the topic 
of the pursuit of happiness in an era of abundance where the 
economic problems that had concerned all socialist intellectuals to 
date had been overcome. Such a period of prosperity would allow 
the conditions for as much freedom as possible to enjoy those 
activities which gave people most satisfaction – the extension 
of leisure time and of cultural activities were given particular 
emphasis. The labour left regarded this as an acquisitive society 
and one that did not take into account the power of capitalist 
interests over the lives of individuals. one popular idea, picked up 
by some on the labour left, was that of the power of advertisers 
as argued by JK galbraith, who believed that through extensive 
advertising campaigns the large corporations could manipulate 
the desires of millions of individuals.117 This comes rather close 
to the idea of ‘false consciousness’ present within much Marxist 
literature. both theories share in common the belief that the real 
interests of the individual are not the ones they believe them to be. 
Such arguments are intended to be liberating, freeing individuals 
from those who exercise power over them, but both suffer from 
the difficulty of who decides what their ‘real interests’ are and far 
from being liberating can quite easily turn in to authoritarianism. 
From this it is possible to assume that individuals are capable of 
determining for themselves what makes them happy.
117 J. K. galbraith, The New Industrial State (london: Hamish Hamilton, 1968)
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The environmentalist lobby also sought to reject Crosland’s emphasis 
on high economic growth believing that it would cause major ecological 
destruction. The so-called ‘zero-growth’ lobby of the 1970s believed that 
any economic growth would be harmful to the environment and that 
production should not be based on profit but should instead the local, 
small-scale and concerned with meeting sufficiency. This argument 
was dismissed by Crosland who believed that the environmental lobby 
was essentially a middle-class pressure group seeking to defend the 
interests of the small towns and rural communities in which they lived. 
while rejecting such zero-growth arguments it is possible to be more 
sympathetic to the idea of environmentally-sustainable growth and to 
take account of externalities in the production process as part of general 
well-being. Moreover, there has been a growing realisation since the 
1970s of the ecological damage that economic activity has produced. 
Again the literature on happiness is important in this respect because 
it stresses the limits to economic growth as the primary indicator of 
happiness. economic growth that is harmful to the environment is likely 
to foster greater unhappiness.
one final issue is the relevance of economic policy for contemporary 
social democrats. Crosland believed that the problems of economic 
underperformance had been resolved. He failed to foresee the 
economic downturn of the 1970s. However, he was not alone. The 
claims made by some at the heart of new labour also suggested that 
the problem of economic underperformance had been resolved – 
statements along the lines of ‘no more boom and bust’ were not just 
political weapons to hurl at opponents. They were also meant to imply 
that the new ‘social democratic supply-side’ policy framework and 
ideas such as ‘neo-classical endogenous growth theory’ were believed 
to be the ways in which economic growth would be maintained. 
Clearly events over the past 12-18 months have shattered this idea of 
long-run economic expansion and leave the old economic concerns 
of socialist intellectuals with the economy, which Crosland believed in 
1956 would soon pass, at the centre of any contemporary concern with 
social democracy and individual happiness. 
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4. GalbRaith: aFFluEncE and thE End oF Social 
dEMocRacy?
Will hutton
we live in an era of abundance. even the disadvantaged enjoy a life 
expectancy, material well-being and access to living standards that 
would have seemed dazzling to most middle-class people 50 years 
ago. A car, a television, fitted carpet and central heating – even a 
mobile phone – are now seen as part of minimum subsistence. The 
wolf is no longer quite so close to the doors of even the very poor.
The impact of cumulative annual gains in productivity on living 
standards has long been recognised by economists; the classical 
economists warned their readers in the early nineteenth century 
that there would come a time when subsistence income would 
mean more than a candle, a mattress and sufficient corn for a loaf 
of daily bread. So it has proved, and on a scale even they could 
never have guessed at. 
Poverty, of course, remains, but the poor benchmark themselves 
not against the minimum required for survival in a state of nature 
but, rather, to the circumstances of the average lifestyle in the here 
and now. They feel poor to the extent that they are excluded from 
the general fruits of the economy. exclusion is still desperately felt, 
but in an affluent society there has been an important change. 
Poverty certainly threatens life chances and the opportunity to 
choose a life that, as Amartya Sen says, one has reason to value. 
but it rarely threatens life itself. Adam Smith could argue that when 
wages fell below the subsistence level, labourers would have 
smaller families, thereby diminishing the supply of labour and 
leading subsequently – after some time-lag – to a self-regulating 
rise in wages that would then push up the birth rate and encourage 
labourers to have larger families.118 The supply and demand for 
118 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 1 (london: Dent, 1956), 71.
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labour, he said, was regulated like any other. no such iron law of 
wages could be hypothesised now.
in fact, many of our embedded assumptions about the economy 
and its workings – some ageing and some very alive – are a hangover 
from the days of scarcity when poverty could mean death. They need to 
be rethought through from first foundations – the core argument of The 
Affluent Society, J.K. galbraith’s seminal book now nearly 50 years old,119 
which remains as startlingly prescient as when it was first published. 
For a generation after its publication, along with his other great book 
The New Industrial State, galbraith established himself as an economist, 
public intellectual and political activist who influenced presidents as 
much as the man and woman in the street. He was a household name 
whose witty one-liners defined a liberal common sense that could 
challenge the conventional wisdom both at home and abroad. 
GalbRaith’S contRibution
galbraith saw capitalism through the prism of power, in particular 
how corporations shape the environment in which they operate 
– a mismatch between the power-neutral world described by free-
market, so-called “classical” economists and economic reality that is 
devastatingly wide, but which, as galbraith would say, has been self-
interestedly designed to obscure the truth. He stressed that the clue 
to the ongoing success of now prodigiously productive capitalism is 
corporations’ ability and capacity to conjure up new wants for them to 
satiate. Profit lies less and less in the sinews of pure manufacture; rather, 
it lies in the capacity to create markets and new wants. The service 
sector – in particular advertising, marketing, selling and distribution – is 
where the capitalist action increasingly resides. The public challenge is 
to prevent corporate gigantism from trivialising human wants, and to 
insist that the parallel prosperity of the public realm – from our parks to 
our schools – is no less central to our individual and social well-being.
119 J.K. galbraith, The Affluent Society (london: Hamish Hamilton, 1958).
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our era of abundance is a long way from the Robinson Crusoe 
state of nature on which economics builds its assumptions, where 
hunter-gatherers exchange the food they have grown or killed, 
and all the parties to the barter know their preferences and need 
for food. These are individuals at the bottom of Maslow’s famous 
hierarchy of needs.120 in those basic conditions, individuals know 
what they want. if a good is not consumed, it perishes; unless the 
market clears, goods literally rot. what is produced through hunting 
and gathering is inextricably linked to what we can consume – and 
goods are scarce.
but this is no analogy for today. we are individuals whose basic 
needs for subsistence are now easily satiated in an age of abundance; 
we are interested in self-actualisation and self-exploration – the 
top of the hierarchy of needs. our lives are quests for satisfaction 
and experience in which we cannot articulate what it is we need 
because we ourselves are looking for it. And because production 
is so much more specialised, the direct link between production 
and consumption that characterises the world of barter breaks 
down completely. instead of demand for what we produce being 
innate, we have to stimulate it through salesmanship, marketing 
and advertising. 
our preferences are not given. instead, they are continually 
being shaped by producers trying to sell us their goods and 
services. And they need to succeed in their salesmanship, otherwise 
they don’t get the sales on which their production and incomes 
depend. in the affluent society, the nexus on which economic 
growth turns includes consumption and the persuasiveness with 
which we are invoked to consume more and more every year. The 
system is not based on the satisfaction of basic needs, which, by 
definition, are stable; rather, it is based on satisfying needs which 
have to multiply year by year or else the economy stagnates. This 
120 Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd edn (new York: Harper & Row, 1970).
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is not necessarily hard; human beings have an infinite variety of 
needs which affluence can express. economic growth in a society 
of abundance depends upon the peripatetic uncovering and 
creation of these new needs, desires and quests for experiences 
along with furnishing the credit to enable consumers to spend now 
rather than having to wait and save.
This may seem self-evident, but it took and takes a galbraith 
to spell out the profound consequences. The key institutions in a 
dynamic contemporary capitalist economy in galbraith’s universe 
are the advertisers (the “hidden persuaders” as Vance Packard later 
called them) and the suppliers of credit. while today’s economic 
consensus explains the allegedly superior economic performance 
of the American and british economies compared to, say, France, 
germany and italy as resulting from Anglo-Saxon labour market 
flexibility, the importance played by their stock markets and a 
general commitment to enterprise, galbraith offers an important 
corrective. instead, the Anglo-Saxon world has been better at 
creating a society of restless consumers who assume mountainous 
volumes of debt to assuage their endlessly stimulated appetite to 
spend. Think in these terms and Anglo-Saxon economic success 
is seen through very different spectacles. it is a triumph of rising 
demand, fuelled by societies that seek satisfaction through 
individual rather than collective pleasures. 
it is this mutual contract – between corporations geared to 
deliver ever-rising volumes of goods and services and individuals 
restlessly assuaging wants they did not know they had by spending 
and spending – that is at the heart of the affluent society. but, as 
galbraith argues in The Affluent Society, this contract has an inbuilt 
bias favouring the private sector over the public. it is not that either 
the public or the private is intrinsically better than the other; it is 
that a good society requires generous supplies of them both. The 
problem is that our needs for public goods are not expressed in this 
mutual private contract between corporation and individual. we 
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may want better medical treatment, higher-quality teaching and 
more sophisticated galleries and venues for the performing arts 
and the like, but there is not the same institutional nexus to supply 
such public goods to meet the demand generated by the public 
dimension of our myriad of wants, nor any accompanying system 
for raising tax revenues with which such public provision might be 
financed. in fact, the institutional nexus works in reverse: politicians 
are frightened of taxing – even more so in a conservative climate in 
which taxes are depicted as coercive and anti-liberty – and so public 
revenues do well to maintain the status quo rather than adding new 
public infrastructure and services. in galbraith’s famous formulation, 
we live in an era of public squalor and private affluence.121
This has a particular impact on the poor. For while they are not 
going to die of their poverty, they find themselves at the bottom of 
a society that is progressively more unequal and less interested or 
capable of furnishing them with the wherewithal for them and their 
families to better themselves. income support for the unemployed, 
the ill and the incapable allows them to live, but it offers no prospect 
of pleasure or self-actualisation. The publicly provided schools for 
the poor offer very limited educational opportunity compared to 
the state schools in rich neighbourhoods or those wholly financed 
by private fees. 
galbraith, writing in 1958, during the first decade in which 
the post-war affluent society had become a social reality, could 
see clearly that what lay ahead was more inequality and ever 
more second-class public provision. He anticipated the growth of 
company investment in intangibles; not just advertising to support 
brand equity and consumption, but investment in design, R and D, 
computer software and in the soft skills necessary for workforces 
to offer customers high value-added experiences. in this complex 
universe, social mobility would fall. The rich would grow richer, 
121 galbraith, The Affluent Society 
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justifying their fortunate position by the doctrine that their riches 
were well deserved; the poor would become ever more trapped, 
condemned by the doctrine that, as they had not bootstrapped 
themselves out of poverty, their situation was one they had 
essentially chosen. The rich were morally superior to the poor.
galbraith’s predictions have proved sadly accurate. Social mobility 
across the industrialised west has fallen,122 the middle and upper-
middle classes have succeeded in securing the educational passports 
to membership of the upper income groups, and it is their children who 
are disproportionately represented at the better universities, business 
and law schools. The welfare state has increasingly become a support 
framework for the poor with little of the investment in intangibles that 
has characterised the private sector, and a framework for the poor 
inevitably becomes a poor framework. Public infrastructure in britain 
and the US has not kept pace with the rise in living standards; the general 
picture has been one of genteel decline. Yet private society has become 
progressively more rich and affluent, and with it the entrenchment of 
a culture of justification, complacency and “contentment”. The better 
off justify being better off because they believe that in some way they 
deserve it. in britain, after 15 years of exceptional economic growth, 
profits at a record share of gDP and the incomes of the top 1% rising 
astronomically, charitable giving by the rich is static. nor has there been 
a surge of private endowments, social patronage or experimentation 
with models for wider social and public improvement. The british rich 
person’s overriding preoccupation is tax evasion and avoidance. 
what galbraith also foresaw, and which became more explicit in 
his writings as he grew older, is how the affluent society would beget a 
new conservative political philosophy.123 in britain, the rise of the labour 
party and one nation Toryism before and after the Second world war 
were reflections of the need to use government power to alleviate the 
122 will Hutton, The World We’re In (Abacus, london 2002), 166–7, 274.
123 J.K. galbraith, The Culture of Contentment (london: Penguin, 1993).
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otherwise desperate condition of the working class during the recession 
years of the 1930s, and with it avert a potential political challenge to 
capitalism. but affluence both removes the urgency of such a political 
response and undermines the progressive coalition. The swelling ranks of 
the affluent middle class do not feel the same urge to express collective 
solidarity and use public goods; they can pay for private goods and their 
quest for satisfaction not through collective action but in individual 
acts of spending that will satiate a newly articulated need. They are 
predisposed to believe that the canons of Thatcherism and free market 
fundamentalism offer them choice, liberty and self-expression, and that 
these are better values than collective endeavour, the public interest and 
mutual sacrifice to achieve common ends.
galbraith believes – and i agree with him – that the good society 
needs both public and private. The majority with the get-up-and-go 
to cast their vote may be rooted in the self-interested middle class, but 
somewhere in the back of their heads, thinks galbraith, lies a recognition 
that altruism and the common interest are not values that should be 
completely binned. A life well lived is not only about amassing riches 
for one’s own and one’s descendants’ satisfaction. Decent housing and 
decent health benefit not just those with access, but everyone; we all 
enjoy the psychic benefit of living in a fair society. A way should be 
found – he floats the idea of a sales tax – that will provide the state with 
the wherewithal with which to act more purposefully.
nEW labouR’S StRuGGlE
watching new labour struggle to find a persuasive progressive 
language and programme to succeed blair, i wonder if galbraith’s 
pessimistic analysis is not more right than even he knew. we live in 
conservative times across the west, and social democrats’ capacity 
to find a philosophy and build a coalition that will further their aims 
in an affluent society is ever more difficult. Trade unions are so weak 
not just because of anti-union legislation, but because persuading 
the newly affluent – and intensely individualistic – young people 
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of today, especially in the service sector, to join a union to further 
their career and prospects is almost impossible. They just don’t see 
the point; and even if they are sympathetic, they see no reason to 
sacrifice their individual freedom of manoeuvre in order to achieve 
collective ends. life without a union is not severe enough – and 
the liberty foregone is too precious – to justify union membership.
And how do progressive politicians find a language to appeal 
to the affluent rich to support the disadvantaged poor? welfarism, 
dependence, hand-outs, feather-bedding: all are pejorative 
sobriquets to be hurled against the activist progressive politician 
who wants to do something. it is better to make no challenge 
to what business wants, whatever its wider consequences; to 
advertise that you are expanding those parts of the welfare state 
like education and health that will benefit the middle class; to risk 
no political capital on arguing for redistribution; and to do what 
you do quietly: this is the essence of new labour’s position. As a 
political formula, it worked for blair, with his Chancellor keeping the 
party faithful happy by quietly briefing that he would do more if he 
ever had the freedom, while blair assuaged the centre.
but a programme of social democracy requires more, and so 
does the health of british politics. brown has hesitated between 
striking out on an updated but clearly contemporary version of 
social democracy, and continuing with Tony blair’s approach but 
with no gordon brown to keep him honest, so tacking even further 
to the right. it is this indecision that is proving fatal to his prime-
ministership, undermining his claim either to be a conviction 
politician or to have a clear vision for the country.
brown’s indecision, however, is part of a wider crisis of the left 
in an affluent society. Social democracy has to extend people’s 
demand for choice and high-quality experience from the private 
realm into the public; the public sector has to be as good at exciting 
demands, and of meeting them, as the private. This requires a 
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multiplicity of providers, competition, an acceptance that some 
citizens may have their demands better met than others, and a 
willingness both to raise taxes and to find other means of revenue-
raising in order to pay for the increased services. Public provision in 
an affluent society requires a blairite embrace of a reconceptualised 
system of delivery and payment, otherwise the social democratic 
game is lost. This does not come easily to the left, committed as it 
is to equality of provision, however second rate. 
on the other hand, social democrats have to be more willing 
to patrol, regulate and direct business activity than they have 
been hitherto. Climate change and the rise of what the outgoing 
chief government scientist Sir David King calls our “obesogenic 
environment” are just two areas where private business decision-
making has to be located in a wider social and environmental context. 
equally, the obvious inequity between the government, providing 
£30 billion of finance to the stricken bank northern Rock, and the 
shareholders who retain the right to direct the company despite its 
evident lack of value without taxpayer support, has exposed the one-
sided nature of the contract between the financial system and society. 
governments can expect propriety and integrity in the management 
of banks, and regulate to ensure it. because the quid pro quo is the 
willingness to provide limitless credit if things go wrong. 
galbraith would have agreed. A revived social democracy 
requires two new thrusts: ultra blairism on public sector reform 
together with a new willingness to construct the architecture in 
which corporations behave, better to serve the public and social 
interest. A third thrust is radically to overhaul the means by which we 
support the poor, while shaming the rich into paying their fair share 
of the bill. economies, galbraith understood well, are at heart moral 
propositions. our politicians on the left, if they are to be successful, 
have to understand that truth and accept the responsibility that 
falls to them within the political spectrum to argue for it. because if 
they do not, nobody else will.
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5. ScitovSky: SatiEty and cREativE conSuMption
Marina bianchi
Tibor Scitovsky, who died in 2002, was one of his generation’s 
most creative economists. His work covered a wide range, 
from international trade and growth to monopoly power and 
competition. but his main interest, and principal legacy, was to 
have clarified the welfare implications of economic interactions. 
in The Joyless Economy124 he explored a previously neglected area, 
the role that ‘stimulating’ activities in all their variety – sports, 
arts, conversation, intellectual activities – can have on individual 
enjoyment and social well-being. Scitovsky broke with economic 
orthodoxy by examining the processes at work in the formation 
of preferences, and the ways these may respond to variables 
such as variety, novelty and change. His attempt to “bring joy into 
economics” did not have much immediate impact on mainstream 
economic thinking. Yet in the past decade or so, all his central 
insights have become subjects of independent research, and many 
of the questions he posed are now among those guiding current 
psychological and economic research. 
ScitovSky’S jouRnEy
Tibor Scitovsky was born in budapest, Hungary, in 1910. in 1920, 
his father, a civil servant, became both President of the Hungarian 
general Credit bank, the largest in the country, and a lifelong 
member of the upper chamber of the Hungarian Parliament. As 
Scitovsky records in his Memoirs,125 the rise in family affluence 
brought by his father’s new position allowed his parents to indulge 
fully their passion for collecting art and antiques. Their new house 
in budapest was a mansion of 18,000 square feet, beautifully 
124  Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (oxford: oxford University Press, 
1992).
125  Tibor Scitovsky, “Memoirs”, undated typescript, in Scitovsky Papers (Rare book, Manuscript, and Special 
Collections library, Duke University, Durham, nC), 10.
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furnished and decorated with the luxury of eighteenth-century 
France. (The house still exists: expropriated in 1952 by Hungary’s 
communist government, it was sold to the british, and remains, 
to this date, the british ambassador’s residence.) These childhood 
years, he recounts, had a great influence on him, shaping his 
attitude towards the many enjoyments life can offer beyond work 
and income.
Scitovsky attended law school in budapest, though with no 
great enthusiasm. He then went to Trinity College, Cambridge. 
There, after two years of “floundering” around, he switched to 
economics – a subject that he found more stimulating. After a 
period back in Hungary, he returned to england to study at the 
lSe, where he discovered Keynes’s General Theory, which, given the 
context of the great Depression, he felt made traditional texts look 
“stale and stuffy”.126 
His early academic work investigated the potential for reconciling 
Keynesian unemployment with neoclassical economic theory. 
However, his novel research on the relationship between involuntary 
unemployment and interest rates in financial markets, a topic that 
remained of long-term interest to him, was not much noticed.
Having served with the American Army in europe – he had 
spent a period of study in the US – at the end of the war Scitovsky 
moved to the United States, where he was appointed to a tenured 
position at Stanford University. 
Until the late 1960s, Scitovsky wrote on a wide array of 
economic problems, always taking an original approach. He began 
with the problem of price determination, where he stressed the 
role of specialised knowledge and information costs in creating 
126  Tibor Scitovsky, “Hindsight economics”, in Scitovsky, Economic Theory and Reality: Selected Essays on their 
Disparities and Reconciliation (Aldershot: edward elgar Publishing, 1995), 225–6.
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monopolistic rents through non-price competition. early on, he 
also explored, in novel fashion, the problem of the interrelations 
betweens first- and second-hand financial markets. He also worked 
on the welfare effects of governmental tariffs, on economic 
integration, and on grants-in-aid for third world countries. 
At the end of the 1960s, he accepted a job in Paris at the 
Development Centre of the oeCD, where he became increasingly 
interested in motivational psychology. This led him to explore the 
different sources of individual satisfaction, which culminated in the 
publication of The Joyless Economy in 1976.
This new phase of his intellectual life, in particular the resulting 
book, was barely understood by his fellow economists. but 
Scitovsky described it as one of the most difficult tasks he ever 
undertook, as well as one of the most exciting: one that greatly 
added to his self-knowledge and his understanding of others. 
For Scitovsky the new direction of his work represented a natural 
and logical extension of his previous interests. His attention to the 
problem of welfare had alerted him to the effects that individual 
behaviours have on personal well-being, while recognising that 
individuals may act with incomplete knowledge of their sources 
of satisfaction, an evident counterpart to his previous work on 
the costs of information. Finally, coming to the United States from 
europe, he was always sensitive to the differences in education 
and culture between the two. it was these, he felt, that, more than 
income or affluence, helped explain the differences in lifestyles 
that he observed.127
SkilFul conSuMption
when Scitovsky began to question the economist’s assumption 
“that consumers can be trusted to know what is best for them”, 
127 ibid., 229, 234–6.
well-being
81
he realised that he himself had no view of the components of 
a good life, of the sources of desires and enjoyments as distinct 
from simple wants.128 it was, he said, from the lesser-known 
writings of Cambridge economists such as Marshall, Keynes and, 
especially, Hawtrey that he started to glean some insights. Marshall 
had uncovered the importance that “self-rewarding” activities, 
those pursued for their own sake, have in motivating individual 
actions. Keynes, for his part, had stressed how the driving force of 
entrepreneurial activity was not mere profit, but the excitement of 
engaging in a risky game. For him, continued capital accumulation 
and technical progress would bring us close to want-satiation and 
open up new opportunities to live wisely, agreeably and well. Yet, 
he was concerned that this new freedom from need would pose a 
problem for the ordinary person with no special talent to occupy 
himself.129 neither Marshall nor Keynes, however, integrated these 
ideas into their economic theory. it was, instead, Hawtrey who gave 
detailed theoretical relevance to them. Hawtrey distinguished 
between two forms of goods and activities, those aimed at 
relieving pain and distress, which he called defensive, and those 
aimed at producing positive pleasure, which he called creative. This 
distinction in Scitovsky’s hands became that on which his own new 
theory of choice turned. He modified Hawtrey’s distinction into 
one between two different forms of satisfaction: those deriving 
from comfort – activities that ease and free life from pain and 
bother – and those deriving from stimulation – self-rewarding and 
creative activities that provide most of life’s pleasure.
This distinction is important because the motivations and 
incentives that work for the one form of satisfaction are not the 
same as those that work for the other. behind the desire to sleep, 
eat or drink there is a need; for rest, for example, or for relieving 
hunger and thirst. by contrast, pleasurable activities such as 
128 Scitovsky, “Memoirs”, 105a.
129  See Scitovsky, “How to bring Joy into economics”, in Tibor Scitovsky, Human Desires and Economic 
Satisfaction: Essays on the Frontiers of Economics (new York: new York University Press, 1986), 188.
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reading, playing, walking, exploring and talking with friends are 
independent of need and are sought for their own sake. in fact, 
behind these activities there might also be needs – for stimulation 
or for the relief of boredom. Yet these needs are not discriminative: 
innumerable activities can supply physical or mental challenges, 
but it requires skill to select them and make them enjoyable. 
As Hawtrey had already forcefully argued, while defensive 
consumption rests mainly on familiar routines and habits, to enjoy 
creative activities requires active effort on our part, an effort of 
knowledge, imagination and exposure.130 Creative consumption is 
also skilful consumption. 
However, it was in a new body of neuro-psychological research 
that Scitovsky found an organising framework and empirical 
support for his new insights. The motivational model that emerged 
from those studies, linked especially to the work of the neuro-
psychologist Daniel berlyne, focused on the concept of arousal – 
the activation of the central nervous system by external stimuli – 
and the ways in which an individual’s feelings of ill- or well-being are 
related to these stimuli.131 Contrary to previous theories of optimal 
arousal, and backed by a consistent body of empirical evidence, in 
berlyne’s approach feelings of pleasure seemed to respond not to 
the levels of the stimulus associated with a given experience, but to 
changes in the stimulus potential. 
novelty, surprise, variety, complexity, uncertainty and contrast 
have the potential to stimulate pleasurable feelings and keep our 
attention, curiosity and interest alive. As a consequence, all the 
situations that tend to increase the stimulus potential, those which 
modify the perceived novelty and variety of an experience when 
130  Ralph george Hawtrey, The Economic Problem (london: longmans, green and Co., 1926), 189–90, and 
Scitovsky, Economic Theory and Reality, 236.
131  See Daniel e. berlyne, Aesthetics and Psychobiology (new York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1971), Pleasure, 
Reward, Preference, ed. berlyne and K.b. Madsen (new York: Academic Press, 1973) and Scitovsky, Joyless 
Economy, 18, 21.
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this is felt to be too low and boring, are pleasure enhancing. So too 
are situations that decrease the stimulus potential of an experience 
when this is felt to be too high, over-burdening or threatening. 
Pleasure is maximal when novelty, variety, uncertainty and so on 
are felt to be neither too high nor too low. Yet reaching a position 
of maximum pleasure is not the same as reaching a position of 
rest, the equilibrium position of economic models. Repeating 
an experience inevitably erodes its novelty potential: maximum 
pleasure, when repeated, is diminished.
not all activities and experiences share this fate, however. There 
are some that for their complexity, internal variety and combinatory 
relations with other forms of activity are able endogenously to 
produce change and become a source of sustained pleasure. These 
are the creative activities which, by contrast with defensive ones, 
are not subject to satiety. 
Had Scitovsky simply stopped at this point, his contribution 
to a theory of choice would already have had rather radical and 
challenging implications. berlyne’s motivational model enlarges 
the scope of individual choice and incentives as depicted in 
economic models. in those models, to choose optimally is, after all, 
rather simple. Preferences are known and so is the individual’s real 
income constraint. All that is required of subjects is to choose the 
most preferred set of goods that is within their budget. This optimal 
position, once reached, is also a position of rest. in Scitovsky’s 
modified approach, however, staying in an equilibrium position 
inevitably modifies it, as it must if sameness brings boredom and 
reduces satisfaction. by implication, more is involved in explaining 
pleasure-yielding choices than just prices and income. There 
is, first of all, the time and frequency of an experience: since the 
stimulating power of novelty and variety is strictly dependent on 
the time that elapses between experiences, the same activity – 
listening to a piece of music or eating the same meal – can become 
appealing again provided some time has passed since the last 
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exposure. As a consequence, knowledge and skills are important, 
for time must be managed and the potential of variety in creative 
activities discovered. The pleasure of experiences that are too easy 
to learn tends also to fade easily. Finally, the social context of choice 
also must be considered. Social interdependencies in consumption 
can amplify or reduce the novelty potential of an experience and 
consequently its enjoyment. The emergence of a new trend in 
movies, literature, or clothing, for example, gives salience to what is 
novel and makes it visible. but the same trend, when too diffused 
and repeated, becomes stale.132 
Scitovsky often argued that in earlier, less affluent times, 
stimulating experiences were often decided for us, exogenously. 
Rich meals and many daily comforts, being rarer and only 
intermittently available, were also a more lasting source of 
stimulation and pleasure.133 now it is the consumer who has to act 
entrepreneurially and look for ways of managing these experiences 
that affect well-being. learning therefore becomes crucial, a source 
of discerning choices though also of innovation and enjoyment. 
Having already discovered in his studies on monopoly the link 
between the distribution of knowledge and the capability to 
innovate, Scitovsky was ready to capture the more dynamic view of 
choice by consumers that was implied in berlyne’s model. 
Scitovsky always insisted that, important though they are, there 
might be difficulties in acquiring consumption skills.
habituation and addiction
Defensive and creative consumption in fact compete with each 
132  i have discussed these issues in Marina bianchi, “novelty, Preferences, and Fashion: when goods Are 
Unsettling”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 47 (2002), 1–18. The more active role that 
consumers play in this alternative approach is analysed in The Active Consumer. Novelty and Surprise in 
Consumer Choice, ed. Marina bianchi (london and new York: Routledge, 1998).
133 Scitovsky, Joyless Economy, 66–7.
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other for consumers’ time, money and human resources. And 
for Scitovsky, creative activities are at a systematic competitive 
disadvantage relative to defensive ones. A first disadvantage is 
one noted already: creative activities require investments of time 
and effort. no matter how simple they might seem, for example 
conversing with friends, still they require attention, time, openness 
and knowledge. As a consequence, the pleasure associated with 
these activities is often not immediate but arises only after these 
investments are made. only after one has suffered many falls and 
minor injuries does skiing become enjoyable, and the same is true 
with many sports. Moreover, since the pleasure associated to them 
is delayed, one has to overcome the doubt as to whether it will 
ever arrive. 
The problem of opting for activities that have delayed and 
uncertain rewards has been much studied in economics, since 
investments, financial and otherwise, have these very characteristics. 
Recently, however, students of habit-formation and addiction 
have uncovered patterns of behaviour that challenge some of the 
assumptions and conclusions of traditional theory.134 in particular, 
empirical evidence seems to support the idea that agents, when 
confronted with choices whose rewards are not immediate but 
distributed over time, can be affected by two distinct forms of myopia. 
According to the first of these, described by a model of 
choice known as “melioration theory”, agents may be unable to 
calculate all the effects that present consumption has on future 
consumption and its enjoyment (e.g. using the car now may affect 
my future attitude to walking). instead, they may end up simply 
134  Mainly that errors do not cancel out with experience, but are systematic; see Richard H. Thaler, “Some 
empirical evidence on Dynamic inconsistency”, Economic Letters 8 (1981), 201–7. Some empirical evidence 
on dynamic inconsistency is in Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics (new York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1991), 127–33. Analyses and case studies of addiction that assume a quasi rational model 
of choice are in Jon elster and ole-Jørgen Skog, Getting Hooked. Rationality and Addiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). The rational addiction model has been developed by gary becker and 
Kevin Murphy in “A Theory of Rational Addiction”, Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988), 675–700. 
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settling for the consumption alternative that gives them higher 
(average) utility at each moment of choice (let’s drive this time). The 
equilibrium result of these actions, chosen piecemeal, corresponds 
to an allocation of resources that might be non-optimal – in other 
words, that might be less rewarding than had the agents been 
farsighted (i end up doing a lot of driving and little walking, though 
i would be better pleased if it were otherwise).135
The second form of myopia causes agents to end up making 
sub-optimal choices even if they have foreknowledge of all the 
effects of past choices. This myopia results from the fact that 
the distance in time of rewards influences the ranking of the 
alternatives.136 when the moment of choice is distant, the delayed 
but more rewarding alternative is ranked higher (tomorrow 
morning i shall exercise), but when the moment of choice arrives, 
the ranking reverts to the more proximate, even if lower, reward 
(when morning arrives i stay in bed). in short, rewards appear larger 
the nearer they are.137
The shortsightedness of piecemeal actions and the magnifying 
of proximate rewards can explain why people might fall into 
patterns of behaviour that reduce rather that enhance pleasure. but 
such patterns, once established, are also difficult to break. both the 
need to compensate for the loss of pleasure due to habituation, and 
the need to avoid the pain of breaking a habit provide incentives 
that reinforce rather than weaken these forms of behaviour. 
For Scitovsky, comfort-seeking activities belong to those welfare-
reducing pursuits that, once established, become a behavioural 
135  Richard J. Herrnstein and Drazen Prelec, “Melioration”, in Choice Over Time, ed. george loewenstein and Jon 
elster (new York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), 241.
136  Robert H. Strotz, “Myopia and inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization”, Review of Economic Studies 
23 (1955–6), 165–80. 
137  george Ainslie and nick Haslam, “Hyperbolic Discounting”, in Choice Over Time, ed. loewenstein and elster, 
57–92; see also Thaler, “Some empirical evidence”, 127.
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trap. Using an explanation very similar to that of melioration 
theorists, Scitovsky shows how comforts can be seductive. easy to 
acquire, satisfactions deriving from comfort reveal their potential 
harmful effects only slowly, but at that point it is too late for agents 
to step out of their habitual pursuits.
one of Scitovsky’s most telling insights was that society at 
large tends to reinforce the competitive disadvantage of creative 
activities. on the one hand, he held that both American Puritanism 
and a dominant culture of production had converged to downplay 
the importance of acquiring skills and competence in consumption. 
And the result of this was paradoxical: the unparalleled increases 
in productivity and richness that industrial production has created 
have been made without the parallel development of the skills 
necessary to enjoy them well.138 At the same time, industrial 
efficiency seems to favour comfort activities over creative ones. 
Driving fast cars reduces distances, and vacuum cleaners compress 
the time involved in housekeeping, but we cannot compress the 
time required to listen to a symphony, read a book or tell a story 
to a friend. Additionally, in an economy of mass reproduction and 
increased diffusion of standardised goods, novelty disappears 
faster, often leaving (unskilled) consumers with the sole option of 
consuming at an ever-increasing pace to maintain satisfaction.139 
thE pRoblEM oF boREdoM
one expression of the biases just mentioned is the problem 
of boredom. it was this problem that led Scitovsky to challenge 
economists’ use of national income as a measure of national 
welfare. He was among the first to comment on the studies of the 
American economist Richard easterlin, on the relation between 
income and self-reported estimates of happiness. These studies 
138  Scitovsky, “what’s wrong with the Arts is what’s wrong with Society”, in Scitovsky, Human Desires and 
Economic Satisfaction.
139 Scitovsky, Joyless Economy, 257.
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revealed a very low correlation between individual happiness and 
the steady and continuous rise of income. what was missing from 
the explanation of well-being that income alone failed to capture?
Scitovsky himself listed possibilities: status, work satisfaction, 
novelty and habituation.140 Recent studies and data on happiness 
across countries have confirmed easterlin’s original results.141 They 
have also confirmed Scitovsky’s intuition about the relevance to well-
being of status – both individuals’ relative position in society and their 
absolute work satisfaction.142 The negative effects that adaptation 
and habits may have on well-being have also been confirmed.143 
on the analysis of novelty, Scitovsky, however, remains highly 
original. His ideas on the role of creative consumption in sustaining 
well-being, on the formation of consumption skills, and even the 
specific consumption technology of this dimension of happiness, 
are areas of research that have yet to be fully explored. 
in his later years Scitovsky added yet another dimension to the role 
of novelty. He noted that the damage that a systematic lack of novelty 
can cause – the problem of unrelieved boredom – falls especially 
heavily on the “idle poor” and on unoccupied youth.144 in recounting 
the personal and intellectual conditions that prompted the writing 
of The Joyless Economy, Scitovsky often reproached himself for having 
completely ignored the “idle poor”. The book, he says, dealt with 
boredom and its relief only from the point of view of those people 
140 ibid., 139.
141  See for example Andrew J. oswald, “Happiness and economic Performance”, Economic Journal 107 (1997), 
1815–31; ed Diener, “Subjective well-being: Three Decades of Progress”, Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999), 
276–302; bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics. How the Economy and Institutions Affect 
Well-being (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
142 See Richard layard, Happiness: Lessons From a New Science (new York: Penguin Press, 2005).
143  See Shane Frederick and george loewenstein, “Hedonic Adaptation”, in Scientific Perspectives on Enjoyment, 
Suffering and Well-Being, ed. D. Kahneman et al. (new York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 302–29; Robert 
Frank, Luxury Fever. Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess (new York: The Free Press, 1999).
144  Scitovsky, “The Desire for excitement in Modern Society”, in Scitovsky, Human Desires and Economic 
Satisfaction, 131–2.
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for whom boredom is a minor nuisance. it is not so for the long-term 
unemployed or unemployable who have more leisure time than they 
know how to use.145 They suffer from chronic boredom, a malady as 
terrible as starvation, and one that can have fatal consequences. For in 
the absence of skills for relieving boredom in a creative way, it is easy 
to revert to the excitement of violence and vandalism.146
Scitovsky also confessed that in the rush to publish the book, 
he failed to realise and stress the fundamental role that education 
has, not only in making life more pleasant and enjoyable, but also 
in preventing those harmful activities that relieve boredom but 
disrupt society. it was to the effects of boredom and the civilising 
role of education (and parental care) that Scitovsky devoted most 
of his attention and research in his later years.147
bEyond SatiEty
“You only have to look around you at all the people who are dieting 
and jogging to realise that, with respect to some needs at least, 
a large part of the advanced countries’ populations have not 
only reached but passed the point of satiety.” So noted Scitovsky 
in 1987.148 Yet, he added, the opposite implicit assumption, that 
consumers’ demands are insatiable, lies behind much thinking 
about how to achieve full employment.149 How to reconcile this 
assumption with the satiability of wants?
in The Joyless Economy, commenting on Hawtrey’s 
characterisation of defensive goods, Scitovsky recalled that not 
all defensive activities cater to wants that are satiable. Addictions 
145 Scitovsky, “My own Criticism of The Joyless Economy”, Critical Review 10 (1996), 600.
146 Scitovsky, “Memoirs”, 106–7.
147  See Scitovsky, “The wages of boredom”, New Perspectives Quarterly (Spring, 2000), 45–51, and Scitovsky, 
“boredom, its Causes and Consequences”, undated typescript, 9.
148 Scitovsky, “growth in the Affluent Society,” in Scitovsky, Economic Theory and Reality, 97–108. 
149 ibid., 97.
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and strong habits are an example. once a habit is formed, as we 
have seen, the decreased pleasure that accompanies repeated 
consumption is compensated for by an escalation of the amount 
of consumption of the same kind. even some social comforts, 
such as the desire for status, can become insatiable. Competing 
for status is an unending game because no competitive advantage 
can be permanent. The relative gain of today becomes the loss 
of tomorrow when new winners emerge.150 in both cases, when 
comforts become insatiable either because of habituation or 
because of an unending competition for status, the results for well-
being are negative.
it follows that creative activities, from the enjoyment of 
friendship to engaging in the arts, would be better candidates 
as sources of unending demand. Yet, as we have seen, Scitovsky 
thought that no effort in developed economies has been devoted 
to the creation of consumption skills comparable to that devoted 
to creating production skills. The result is a distortion that translates 
into an over-investment of individual and social resources in 
defensive activities and an under-investment in creative ones. This 
insight is perhaps Scitovsky’s single greatest legacy.
concluSion
what normative conclusions can we can draw from this brief 
discussion? First of all, and obviously, that it would improve 
individual and social well-being to redress the balance in favour of 
activities that have a more creative, self-rewarding and enduring 
effect on enjoyment. This means a greater regard for a liberal 
educational system, one that privileges generalised skills, individual 
involvement and active participation. but it also means greater 
150  i have criticised these arguments, particularly that status competition has only negative effects on welfare, 
in Marina bianchi, “if Happiness is So important, why Do we Know So little About it?” in Handbook on the 
Economics of Happiness, ed. luigino bruni and Pier luigi Porta (london: edward elgar Publishing, 2006), 
127–50. 
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attention to the early years of learning where many of one’s first 
habits are formed. Public pre-schooling, extended paid maternity 
– and paternity – leave and the shortening of the working week, 
as a means to facilitate parents’ availability to their children, were 
Scitovsky’s own repeated policy recommendations.
This means also, however, that consumption is looked at with 
freer eyes, as an activity that has an innovative dimension that is 
not different from that displayed in production. All too often, even 
in recent studies, consumption is represented with a moralising 
attitude, one that identifies it with consumerism and materialism. This 
representation usually includes idealising a world of frugality and of 
moderation in consumption. but if goods and activities are creative, 
consumers may actually generate value and not destroy it. The key is 
not to consume less, but to consume skilfully and with discernment.
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aFtERWoRd
thE GREatESt happinESS pRinciplE: itS tiME haS coME
Richard layard
A good society is one where people are as happy as possible, and 
as few as possible are miserable. That is what many enlightened 
people believed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
time has come to reassert that humane philosophy and to put it 
into practice. 151
As i shall argue, the belief was always right. but it was difficult 
to put it into practice because we knew so little about the causes 
of happiness. over the past 30 years, however, we have learned a 
great deal, as a result of the explosive growth in the new science of 
happiness. At the same time, it has become more imperative than 
ever to focus on happiness as the objective of public policy. For we 
have largely eliminated the obvious evils of absolute poverty and 
premature death. but, despite rapid rises in living standards, happiness 
has not risen over the past 50 years in britain or the USA. if we want 
further rises in happiness, we need to focus seriously on what really 
causes happiness and misery.
i will begin by discussing the causes of happiness and why it has 
not risen.152 i shall then defend the greatest happiness principle and 
show how it differs from the principles of laissez-faire economics. 
Finally, i shall illustrate how it should alter our priorities for 
public policy.
thE cauSES oF happinESS
Happiness is an objective dimension of all our experience – like 
temperature. At every instant we feel good or bad, on a scale that 
151 i would like to thank brian barry for help with this paper.
152  See Richard layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (london: Penguin books, 2005). Allen lane gives 
the evidence.
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runs from the extremes of misery to utmost bliss. whether we feel 
good or bad is affected by many factors running from physical 
comfort to our inner sense of meaning, and “pleasure and pain” are 
not adequate terms for what we are talking about. what matters 
is of course the totality of our happiness over the months and 
years. The science enables us to measure this and to attempt to 
explain it.
To measure happiness, we can ask a person how happy he 
is – or we can ask his friends or independent investigators. These 
reports are highly correlated. The big breakthrough has been in 
neuroscience. Researchers have identified an area in the left front 
of the brain where good feelings are experienced, and another 
in the right front where bad feelings are experienced. Activity in 
these brain areas alters sharply when people have good or bad 
experiences. And when we compare people, those who describe 
themselves as happy are more active on the left side than unhappy 
people, and less active on the right side. So the old behaviourist 
idea that we cannot know how other people feel has at last been 
put back in the dustbin where it belongs.
So, how are we doing? when britons or Americans are asked 
how happy they are, there appears to have been no improvement 
in happiness over the past 50 years – nor do the same individuals 
report themselves as happier over time, even though they are 
richer. Moreover, psychiatric surveys show that more people suffer 
from depression, and crime is also significantly higher – another 
indicator of dissatisfaction. These are devastating facts that cannot 
be ignored.
what explains them? why has happiness not increased at the 
same time that living standards have risen so sharply? And why 
in particular is there no increase in happiness at the upper tail of 
the income distribution, when income inequality has increased 
so much?
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To answer these questions we have to look at the causes of 
happiness. in every study, satisfaction with family/personal life 
is the most important, in terms of variance explained. Financial 
satisfaction generally comes next, but this is not well correlated 
with income, for reasons i’ll explain. Then comes work – whether 
you have work (if you want it) and whether you like your work. 
This is followed by your satisfaction with your community. And of 
course good health and political freedom have big effects.
So how are we doing on these various causes? incomes are up, 
but there is little increase in financial satisfaction. This is because 
people are to a large extent comparing their incomes with what 
others like them are getting or with what they themselves have got 
used to. if your comparator income is rising as fast as your actual 
income, this blunts the gain in happiness as actual incomes rise.
Moreover, as income rises, extra income brings less extra 
happiness. The science of happiness enables us to measure this 
effect – an extra £1 for a rich person brings one-tenth as much 
extra happiness as it would to a person one-tenth as rich.153 So it is 
not surprising that big rises in upper incomes bring so little extra 
happiness.
i do however believe that over the past 50 years our rise in living 
standards has had some positive effects on our overall happiness. 
but this has been offset by the negative effects of worsening 
human relationships – more broken families, more pressure at work 
and less cohesive communities.
For most people a key determinant of happiness is whether 
they feel that other people are on their side – or alternatively 
that they are a threat. So we learn a lot from how people reply to 
153  Richard layard, guy Mayraz and Stephen nickell, “The Marginal Utility of income” (lSe mimeo, September 
2006).
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questions about trust. A question often asked is: “would you say 
that most people can be trusted, or would you say that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?” in britain and the US the 
percentage who say “Yes, most people can be trusted” has fallen 
from 55 per cent in 1960 to under 35 per cent today. by contrast, in 
continental european countries, where data exist from 1980 only, 
trust has, if anything, been increasing.
Since human life began, senior citizens have lamented a 
supposed decline of morals. but here is some further evidence of a 
decline in the past 50 years. At various times, samples of Americans 
have been asked whether they believe that people lead “as good 
lives – moral and honest – as they used to”. in 1952, as many said 
“Yes” as said “no”. by 1998, three times as many said “no”.
The decline in trust is especially distressing when it affects 
children. in a wHo survey of 11–15-year-olds, the children were 
asked whether they agreed that “most of the students in my class(es) 
are kind and helpful”. The percentages saying “Yes” were over 75 
per cent in Sweden, Switzerland and germany, 53 per cent in the 
United States and less than 46 per cent in Russia and england.
A key problem seems to be the growth of individualism 
(stemming in particular from the USA), which says that your main 
objective is to make the most of yourself – which often means 
to do the best for yourself compared to other people. This is a 
terrifying and lonely objective. People do of course feel obligations 
to other people as well, but these are not based on any clear set of 
ideas. The old religious sanction is gone, and so too is the post-war 
religion of social solidarity. we are left with no clear concept of the 
common good.
we definitely need such a concept if we are to have a cohesive 
society. And it has to be an ideal which includes the welfare of all. 
if we had such a concept, it would not only help us think about 
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policy, but, more important, it would motivate each citizen to 
contribute to the good of others and to get satisfaction from 
doing so.
thE GREatESt happinESS pRinciplE
So here is the concept we need:
the common good consists in the happiness of all;
the good society is one where people are as happy as possible, and as 
few as possible are miserable;
the right action (and the right policy) is the one that produces the 
greatest happiness and, especially, the least misery.
This is of course what bentham and many british thinkers in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed. i have added only 
one modification to bentham. i believe the relief of misery is 
more important than the promotion of great happiness So it is 
more socially desirable to increase the happiness of a miserable 
person than to increase by the same amount the happiness of 
someone who is already happy. This is an important change from 
bentham’s view that all that matters is the sum of happiness – so 
that extra happiness is equally valuable whoever experiences it. 
This “additive assumption” of bentham’s has been frequently used 
as an argument against his version of utilitarianism – and rightly 
so. but it in no way invalidates a modified version of utilitarianism 
in which society’s welfare depends only on the happiness of the 
citizens, but with different weights for citizens at different levels 
of happiness.154
154  in formal terms, if we assume social welfare is measured by Σhi
a/ά where hi is the happiness of the it 
person and ά≤ 1, ethical choice is concerned with the value of ά. if ά = 1, we have a benthamite approach, 
if ά = -∞ , we have a Rawlsian one. The main debate in ethics should now be about the value of ά.
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but many people question the whole basis of an approach that 
focuses on happiness. Sen, williams and nozick, among others, 
have made major criticisms.155 The main ones relate to “other 
goods”, expediency, rights, agency, adaptation and the nanny state. 
othER GoodS
why the greatest possible happiness? what is so special about 
happiness? why not the greatest possible health, autonomy, 
accomplishment, and so on? The answer is that happiness is the 
only experience that is self-evidently good. if i ask you why health 
is good, you can give reasons: people should not feel pain, they 
should be able to function well, be of use to others, and so on. or, 
if asked why autonomy is good, you will find reasons: people feel 
better when they can control their lives. And so on. but if i ask you 
why happiness is good, you can find no reason: you will say that 
it’s self-evident. The reason for this is deep in our biology. we are 
programmed to enjoy experiences that are good for our survival, 
and that is why we have survived. So the desire to be happy is a 
completely central feature of our nature.
Fortunately, we have also been programmed in part to have 
a sense of fairness. if a mean has to be divided, most of us accept 
(sometimes grudgingly) that it should be divided 50:50 – on the 
basis that in principle others count as much as we do.
if you put this idea together with the fact that each of us 
wants to be happy, you arrive at the benthamite principle. it is 
both idealistic and realistic. it puts others on an equal footing with 
ourselves, where they should be, but (unlike some moral systems) it 
also allows us to take our own happiness into account as well.
155  Robert nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (new York: basic books 1974); Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-examined 
(oxford: oxford University Press, 1992); Amartya Sen and bernard williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond (new 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
SoCiAl MARKeT FoUnDATion
98
ExpEdiEncy
The second objection is that the rule is impractical and encourages 
expediency. not so. we all know we cannot evaluate every action 
moment by moment against the overall benthamite principle. 
That is why we have to have sub-rules, like honesty, promise-
keeping, kindness and so on, which we normally follow as a matter 
of course and feel bad if we do not. And that is also why we need 
clearly defined rights embedded in a constitution. but when moral 
rules come into conflict with each other (or legal rights do), we 
need an overarching principle to guide us, and this is what 
bentham provides.
The rule is also criticised for putting ends before means, by being 
consequentialist. This is a misconception. if you take a decision, the 
consequences include the whole sequence of feelings experienced 
by those affected – those experienced during the action (the 
means) as well as those that follow it (the ends). A horrible action 
causing great pain would require extraordinarily good (and certain) 
outcomes to justify it. indeed it would normally hurt the feelings of 
the author and he should be programmed to hate doing it.
RiGhtS
Another objection to the principle is that it does not start from human 
rights or desirable “capabilities”. but how can we start there? if we start 
writing down a list of human rights, any reasonable person will say, 
why do you include this and not that? on what basis do you make your 
selection? why do these rights or capabilities matter more than any 
others you might include? A very reasonable answer is that some rights 
or capabilities are more conducive to human happiness than others. but 
then you are not starting from rights, you are starting from happiness.
in his discussion of desirable capabilities, Sen acknowledges 
the obvious problem of how we compare the importance of 
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advancing one set of capabilities with another. He suggests 
that we choose the weights by letting the population vote. but 
voting must be preceded by rational debate. How would a citizen 
decide how to cast his vote? He would surely want to compare 
the relative importance of different capabilities in contributing 
to some overall objective. what more obvious objective than 
human happiness?
Moreover, political philosophy should be a sub-set of moral 
philosophy. in a democracy, what people vote for will reflect their 
general moral system. Those who argue for a wide range of positive 
rights must explain how the population can be induced to support 
them. i doubt whether this is possible unless people feel some 
general obligation or duty to promote the welfare of their fellow 
citizens. So what we need is a moral (and political philosophy) 
that starts from some general duty to promote the (weighted) 
happiness of all, as best we can.
aGEncy
one important good, as i have said, is the sense of control over your 
life, and people generally enjoy a pound they have earned more 
than one they have been given. These are important truths which 
are often labelled as the importance of “agency”. but they do not 
challenge the principle of the greatest happiness. 
what would challenge that principle would be the assertion 
that, even if you sensed you had control, that would not be enough 
– you need to have actual control. nozick has argued for that view 
via a fanciful thought experiment. imagine a machine, he says, to 
which your inert body can be attached but which can make you 
feel exactly as if you were leading a normal active life. would you 
plug in, asks nozick, expecting the answer “no”? And if the answer 
is “no”, says nozick, this shows that feeling happy and active is not 
enough – you actually have to do something.
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Most of us probably would say “no”, but not because agency 
matters more than experience. we would not believe the machine 
could deliver the same experience (no machine ever could), and 
someone might even switch it off. or we might want to bring 
happiness to others, which we could not do through the machine. 
And so on. nozick’s is a flawed test and we can safely continue to 
believe that all that ultimately matters are the feelings that we and 
others experience.
adaptation
Another objection is that humans adapt: some people can be 
happy even when external circumstances are harsh. People can 
adapt in part to poverty. According to Sen, this might be used to 
justify leaving them in poverty. but of course the corollary also 
holds: people adapt to wealth and get limited extra pleasure from 
it. So adaptation does not blunt the case for redistribution – the 
rich will largely adapt to the loss of income.
in fact, happiness research provides by far the most powerful 
evidence there is in favour of redistribution. within any one country, 
there is sharply diminishing marginal utility of relative income. And 
across countries there is sharply diminishing marginal utility of 
absolute income: this is the clearest argument for third world “aid” 
that i know.
However, reverting to adaptation, it cannot be right to have a 
social philosophy which ignores it. it is one of the most fundamental 
properties of all living organisms. why ignore it, especially when 
this has no especially conservative implications? when it suits him, 
Sen invokes subjective emotion. For example in rich countries he 
focuses on relative rather than absolute income, arguing rightly 
that people should be able “to appear in public without shame”. 
This involves an explicit appeal to people’s subjective states. 
However, when it comes to adaptation, he objects. but, surely, 
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we should be even-handed, and base all policy on its impact on 
people’s feelings. if some things are easier to adapt to than others, 
and some, like mental illness, are harder to adapt to, this is highly 
relevant to public policy.
thE nanny StatE and laiSSEz-FaiRE EconoMicS
Finally, there are some people who might accept the greatest 
happiness principle as a private ethical guide but reject its use for 
public policy. it is easy to see why supporters of a minimal state 
should not want to base government upon it.
As we know from welfare economics, if we take tastes as given, 
private voluntary exchange will produce the most efficient possible 
outcome unless there are economies of scale, information problems 
or external effects (where one agent affects another directly and 
not through voluntary exchange.) This powerful theorem implies 
correctly that any effective society must rely heavily on the 
unfettered choices of self-determining agents.
but the assumptions also underline where state activity is 
needed. These conditions include the huge variety of cases where 
agents affect others directly (e.g. through crime or advertising) or 
where public tastes could be improved to the benefit of all (e.g. 
through moral education). This raises the spectre of an overactive 
state regulating much of our life.
but here we should immediately go back to psychology and 
the causes of happiness. People do not like regulation as such – 
it makes them miserable. Almost certainly, bureaucrats obsessed 
with objective standards already interfere in the name of those 
standards beyond the level that is justified in terms of happiness. 
but, equally true, there are some areas where the state could 
manifestly do more to promote a happy lifestyle. let me end with 
a few examples.
SoCiAl MARKeT FoUnDATion
102
public policy iMplicationS
taxation and redistribution
in almost any political philosophy, redistribution is one role of 
the state. The greatest happiness principle bases the case for 
redistribution partly on the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
if there were no efficiency cost of redistribution, this fact would 
argue in favour of total income equality. but there is an efficiency 
cost, since taxes (spent on services) do discourage work effort.
but happiness research puts work effort into a new perspective. 
individuals work partly in order to raise their income relative 
to others. but it is impossible for the average person to raise his 
income relative to others. So some of the work effort is wasted. it is 
like an arms race. Thus, if taxes somewhat discourage work effort, 
they are orchestrating a desirable arms-limitation agreement. They 
are reducing the unnecessary sacrifice of family life and social life 
that excessive work entails. 
existing knowledge shows this is a serious issue, but does not 
offer a precise figure for policy use. So i am not saying that taxes 
should be higher than they are – but they should be higher than if 
you had not considered this point.
Expenditure on mental health
when it comes to expenditure, there is one obvious area of 
shameful neglect. one in six britons is currently a diagnosable 
case of clinical depression and/or chronic anxiety disorder. only 
a quarter of these people are in treatment. For most, the only 
available treatment is pills prescribed by a non-specialist gP. This is 
in flagrant contravention of niCe guidelines which say these people 
should also be offered modern evidence-based psychological 
therapies, which are at least as effective as drugs. They are what 
the majority of patients want, and, if they cannot have them, many 
patients prefer to go untreated. This volume of untreated suffering 
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is especially scandalous when it turns out that treating it would 
involve no net cost to the exchequer – because of the attendant 
savings on incapacity benefits.156
So why does this situation persist? i believe it reflects a deep-
rooted form of materialism, or what one might call “objectivism” – a 
belief that the subjective world is too fuzzy for us to take it seriously. 
Yet the subjective world is what we experience each moment of our 
lives. in truth, the severity of depression and anxiety states can be 
measured quite accurately, and the best therapists are as dedicated 
as physicians and surgeons (or more so) to measuring the impact 
of their treatments.
building character in childhood
it would of course be much better to prevent mental illness than 
to have to treat it. This ought to be a major role of our educational 
system – to implant the seeds of a happy life and of one that brings 
happiness to others.
Most schools pay too little attention to this. it is not easy to teach 
but well-tested materials are becoming available at an encouraging 
rate. (one example is the Penn Resiliency Programme now being 
used in three UK local authorities.) Teachers should be taught to use 
these materials, and in secondary schools Personal Social and Health 
education (PSHe) ought to be a specialist subject in which teachers 
can specialise in their postgraduate certificate in education.
parenting
Another obvious area where the state has to become more 
involved is the quality of parenting. if bad parenting produces 
crime and bad behaviour – let alone personal misery – the state 
must act at many levels.
156  Richard layard, David Clark, Martin Knapp and guy Mayraz, “Cost benefit Analysis of Psychological 
Therapy”, National Institute Exonomic Review (2007).
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Parenting should be taught in schools. Above all, people should 
recognise the huge responsibility involved in having children well 
before they actually decide to have their own. Then parenting 
classes should be offered to parents around their first pregnancy, 
and these should cover not only biology but also the emotional side 
of child-rearing – including its impact on the relations between the 
parents. And finally there should be high-quality services available 
when parents run into trouble. There exist evidence-based 
interventions which should be readily on offer. Here as elsewhere, 
what is different from the past is that the new interventions rely less 
on the few people of great wisdom and more on the findings of 
science which can be implemented by ordinary mortals.
advertising and gambling
Finally i want to take two examples where tastes are clearly 
affected by public policy. Advertising is obviously meant to change 
our tastes, so we are entitled to ask, “is the change for the better?”. 
Undoubtedly some advertising provides valuable information. but 
a lot of advertising makes us feel we need things we previously 
didn’t need. The advertiser may have only wanted us to buy his 
brand rather than another. but the overall effect is to make people 
want more. This means that we are less contented with what we 
have. The most serious effect is on children, who put parents under 
intolerable pressure to buy the latest doll or the coolest make of 
footwear. The waste is extraordinary, and children get the idea that 
they need this vast array of spending just to be themselves. That 
is the reason why Sweden bans commercial advertising directed 
at children under the age of 12.157 every country should learn from 
this example. 
Similarly in the case of gambling. laissez-faire economics 
says: “if people are willing to pay, let them spend their money as 
they want.” but the expansion of gambling can so easily produce 
157 For the definition of the law, see www.konsunentverket.se.
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addicts. Under existing gambling laws, there are at least 150,000 
gambling addicts in this country, and this addiction blights both 
them and their families. if gambling laws were eased, some people 
might gain a little extra enjoyment at the cost of increased misery 
for others. it is hard to see how this could be justified.
concluSion
we are at the beginning of a major revolution in public values, 
reflecting two main forces. one of these is our historical experience. 
increasingly, people realise that ever-growing affluence brings less 
enhanced satisfaction than they expected. There is also a major 
revulsion against many blinkered forms of managerialism that appeal 
only to self-interest. People are looking for something more in life – 
involving less selfishness and more devotion to a common cause.
At the same time there is the new science of happiness, which 
provides a more accurate account of what makes people happy than 
the cruder forms of elementary economic theory. it shows, for example, 
that people who are mainly concerned with their own welfare are less 
happy than those who are more concerned with others. And it shows 
that these attitudes can be affected by public policy.
This points the way for a revolution in political philosophy. At 
present we have no coherent political philosophy that inspires 
our society. Rampant individualism has filled this vacuum and 
contributes to alienation from the political process. but individualism 
is inherently inconsistent. it appears to promote the interest of 
individuals, but it cannot do so, because the other individuals we 
would like to encounter are not individualistic. 
instead, we need a political philosophy which is intrinsically 
defensible but also internally consistent. Consistency means that 
if people use the philosophy in their individual lives, the result will 
be the society which the philosophy advocates. The principle of 
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the greatest happiness satisfies this requirement. we want a society 
where people desire to produce as much happiness in the world as 
they can. if everyone thinks like that, they will all end up happier. 
This is a consistent philosophy.
it would, of course, involve reversing a trend, and many people 
assume that trends go on forever. That is not how i read history. 
in many areas i see something more like cycles. For example, we 
can observe clear ups and downs in the extent to which social 
responsibility has been stressed in our national lifestyle. in the early 
seventeenth century it was de rigueur; while the eighteenth century 
was more easy-going. The nineteenth century saw increased 
social responsibility; while the past 40 years have seen increasing 
individualism. it is quite possible that the current trend will be 
reversed again in the coming decades, as it was 200 years ago.
we do not need a return to Victorian values, some of which 
were pretty gloomy. instead, we need a philosophy which fully 
values happiness and enjoyment, but at the same time enjoins us 
to strive for the happiness of others. And that is the philosophy of 
the greatest Happiness.
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